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This dissertation revisits old questions regarding how to increase manufacturing skills, 
but with attention to the asymmetrical position of large and small firms in manufacturing supply 
chains.  Small sized firms (under 500 employees) employ roughly half the U.S. workforce, but 
typically have fewer resources to invest in training their employees compared to their larger-
sized counterparts, contributing to recognized labor market inequities.   
Power and resource asymmetries between large and small firms are particularly 
pronounced in the automotive industry. A large body of research on global supply chains 
provides a foundation for this inquiry into how suppliers might adjust their training practices in 
response to the constraints and expectations of their automotive clients. 
Integrating approaches from cluster- and supply-chain-based research, the dissertation’s 
three papers address three related questions: 1) How is skill dispersed across industries supplying 
the U.S. automotive industry?; 2) How do supply chain dynamics affect suppliers’ ability to train 
and compensate skilled workers?; and 3) How might smaller companies gain access to training 
resources in automotive clusters where politics and institutions favor larger firms? 
The first paper in the dissertation describes the skill requirements of industries in the U.S. 
automotive cluster.  I show that the relationship between skills and wages is uneven and 
complicated: wages vary by supply chain tier, but in the opposite direction as skill requirements.  
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The automotive industry clearly depends on the high-level manufacturing skills of sectors 
supplying intermediate goods, yet the lower wages in these sectors may impede skill 
regeneration and upgrading. 
The second paper investigates the training decisions of suppliers in a local automotive 
cluster. I find that cost reduction trends can deter suppliers from investing in training their own 
production technicians, but also that suppliers can leverage their supply chain position and 
activate local networks to increase training in spite of negative supply chain pressures.  
The third paper addresses a bias in the training system diffusion literature toward larger 
multi-national corporations. Shifting the focus to smaller multi-national enterprises, I find they 
are well positioned to activate institutional resources, both global and local, to introduce more 
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Small sized firms employ roughly half the U.S. workforce, but often have fewer 
resources to invest in training their employees compared to their larger-sized counterparts. 
Numerous studies have documented this training discrepancy, which contributes to recognized 
labor market inequities. In response, labor market analysts have suggested directing federal 
investments in workforce development to support smaller, resource-constrained firms, 
overlooking the potential for smaller firms to benefit from sustained public investments in 
regional training systems originally designed to support larger corporations.  
This dissertation addresses a noted policy gap regarding the role of technical training in 
firm and area upgrading by focusing on the complementarities between the labor market 
demands of large and small firms in global value chains and local industrial clusters. Regional 
economists note that when large and small companies compete for skilled labor and training 
resources, large firms most often win. Large firms have more power in their negotiations with 
the public sector compared to smaller firms and are in a better position to capture limited public 
resources. While smaller firms may have less initial bargaining power, their greater dependence 
on public training systems means they are well positioned to partner with workforce practitioners 
to inform innovations that can further extend service delivery. 
This dissertation seeks to answer the following three questions:  
1. How is skill dispersed across industries supplying the U.S. automotive industry? 
2. How do supply chain dynamics affect smaller companies’ ability to train and 
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compensate skilled workers?  
3. How might smaller companies gain access to training resources in automotive 
clusters where politics and institutions favor larger firms? 
By analyzing firms’ positions in both global value chains and local labor markets, I seek 
to understand how related constraints and advantages shape firms’ training decisions and their 
proclivity to connect with and inform the development of regional training resources. I am 
especially interested in understanding how we can support firms along an entire production 
supply chain, utilizing relationships between large and small firms to reduce the training gap.  
Strategies that embed training within a supply chain framework can help state and local 
workforce practitioners extend support to smaller firms. 
Two frameworks are key to my research: a global value chains perspective and a regional 
economic development perspective. The mechanisms through which training investments lead to 
small firm training and skill upgrading involve network, political, institutional, and supply chain 
relationships. These related dynamics motivate my supply-chain-based approach to measuring 
skill demand in the U.S. automotive cluster. I further explore these mechanisms for skill 
upgrading through in-depth studies of growing, yet skill-constrained, automotive clusters in the 
U.S. South and Mexico, and find evidence that smaller companies might benefit from larger 
companies’ training investments.  
In examining the skill demand and training activities of smaller companies in automotive 
clusters, I identify supply-chain-based dynamics that suppress training investments. I also find 
some promising indications that cluster- and supply-chain-based relationships can disrupt and 
assuage these negative pressures, creating room for training investments that have the potential 
to boost firm productivity and job quality.  
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There is a large body of literature describing how cluster dynamics support smaller firms, 
and an almost equally expansive literature on how local firms link up to global supply chains, but 
little research in terms of skill development.  In both fields, the market or the market-based 
responses of the public education system are the mechanisms for training provision.  Rarely do 
we examine how the private sector produces and reproduces skilled labor—this only occurs in 
studies of firm-internal training practices, not in the context of firm-to-firm relationships. 
National and international comparative studies likewise focus on how the private and public 
sector engage each other to invest in education and training, rather than how firms engage each 
other. The varieties of capitalism literature describes skill development regimes at the national 
level in detail, but obscures local level dynamics, supply chain relationships and international 
networks.  
Of course, we can draw great insight from the existing bodies of research on cluster and 
supply chain dynamics. The most detailed and descriptive work on supply chains cannot help but 
examine place-based connections; similarly, the most detailed and descriptive work on cluster 
dynamics cannot help but examine the extra-local and global relationships that affect the local 
cluster. But in examining opportunities for smaller firms to invest in training, these intersecting 
dynamics must be more explicit, and training should be a specific subject of research. 
Empirical Context—Focus on the Automotive Industry 
This dissertation addresses research questions regarding skill demand and development in 
the context of the global automotive industry, given the industry’s dependence on technical skill, 
and the hierarchal governance structure that has multi-national and local suppliers operating 
under significant constraint. Larger lead firms (“Automakers”) have substantial power to 
influence behavior along the supply chain, indicating that the supply chain structure may be 
central to extending training resources to smaller firms in this industry.  
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Automakers (e.g., Ford, Toyota) are the primary coordinators of automotive supply chain 
activity and have the power to direct their suppliers to meet certain performance standards, 
including suppliers located across international boundaries.  Their supplier upgrading programs 
can be tremendously helpful to participants, but access is limited to their most strategic suppliers. 
These programs may also have spillover effects that facilitate local firm upgrading when local 
firms are co-located with automotive suppliers. 
Automakers are also powerful in their branch plant locations.  They have the power to 
solicit public training subsidies vis-à-vis their negotiations with subnational state governments 
and are well positioned to influence the regional training institutions that structure opportunities 
for upgrading.  Automakers are able to solicit fairly large (up to $40 million) training incentives 
and infrastructure.  Their direct (Tier 1) suppliers have also received large local training 
subsidies. 
The increasingly important role of Automakers’ Tier 1 suppliers demands our attention. 
The first paper in this dissertation examines the occupations and occupational skills required by 
Automakers, Tier 1 suppliers, and Tier 2 suppliers in the U.S., as well as their average wages, in 
order to identify how skill demand is dispersed across supply chain tiers.  The analysis draws our 
attention to the high level of skill required by Tier 1 and Tier 2 companies, suggesting that Tier 1 
suppliers are directly responsible for managing much of the skill in the automotive supply chain. 
Like Automakers, Tier 1 suppliers exercise power through their supply chains and in their 
branch plant locations.  Large global suppliers from a number of automotive-producing countries 
(primarily the U.S., Germany, Japan and increasingly China) make up the global supply chain in 
new and old automotive regions. Global suppliers’ increasingly strategic and expansive role in 
the automotive industry may even block local firms from upgrading into the automotive value 
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chain.  But it is unclear what role these global suppliers might play in facilitating knowledge and 
practice transfer to local firms or to their own supply network.  Part of the reason we know so 
little about these suppliers is that they are rarely distinguished in empirical studies, which often 
refer to them as “follow source” suppliers, because they follow Automakers to all their global 
locations, usually upon request.  These companies seem to operate either under the direction of 
their clients or their own headquarters location.  They seem not to have any agency of their own.   
German Automakers and Apprenticeship Practice in North American Branch Plant 
Locations  
Papers two and three in this dissertation evaluate training practices in two different North 
American automotive clusters. I specifically examine local clusters where the lead firms and 
many of the first tier suppliers are of German origin, and where these firms have been engaged in 
processes of apprenticeship program expansion. This focus allows me to observe how foreign 
multi-national enterprises of various sizes, but of the same industry and national origin, navigate 
host country politics and institutions to carve out a competitive position in the regional labor 
market.  These cases also allow me to study the attempted transfer of German-style 
apprenticeship programs, a training practice considered a global best practice by international 










PAPER 1:  A MEASURE OF INTERDEPENDENCE: SKILL IN THE AUTOMOTIVE 
SUPPLY CHAIN1 
 
As policy makers grapple with the evolving conditions of global competition, they are 
regularly reminded that high skilled workers are in demand.  The education sector and workforce 
development agencies are hard at work to infuse new and returning labor market participants 
with “21st century skills”—STEM skills, communication, and problem-solving skills—key to 
the functioning and improvement of U.S. manufacturing operations. 
A common assumption is that businesses are uniformly able to leverage the skills of the 
workforce and reward higher skilled workers with higher wages.  But the relationship between 
skills and wages is actually uneven and complicated.  Mediating factors—including firm size and 
supply chain position—temper and distort the relationship.   
Labor scholars often assume that the disconnect between skills and wages, among small 
firms or nonunion firms, reflects weakened labor market institutions, and, specifically, the lack 
of worker protections and bargaining ability.  This is an important factor, but an equally 
compounding issue relates to the power that firms have in their buyer-supplier relationships and 
the degree to which those relationships influence job quality and pay. 
By ignoring this uneven landscape, we may be making empty promises to workers and 
firms that are not able to solicit wages compensatory to their skill levels.  Attending to the 
                                                          
1 This paper will appear as an article in the journal Economic Development Quarterly. The citation is as follows: 
Forbes, A. (forthcoming) A Measure of Interdependence: Skill in the Automotive Supply Chain. Economic 
Development Quarterly. In a special issue on Manufacturing and Innovation. 
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pressing macroeconomic demands facing training and education systems, we may overstate the 
abilities of existing industry to pay for higher-level skills and to improve their own position in 
the supply chain through skill upgrading.  Policy makers, aiming to attract high skill industries 
and occupations, may overlook ways to utilize and leverage the skills of the existing workforce 
to advance more inclusive, equitable, and sustainable growth. 
We need tools to draw out the relationship between skills, compensation, and existing 
industry structure.  One way to explore this is at the industry level. This study examines how 
manufacturing skills are dispersed among related industries.  Since it is also important to 
consider how these industries are situated vis-à-vis critical suppliers and clients, this study 
situates industries by their supply chain position in the U.S. automotive cluster, identifying 
constraints in this context and suggesting supply-chain-specific solutions. 
Simply recognizing this uneven terrain can help local economic and workforce 
development practitioners identify skill-centered strategies to address strengths and weaknesses 
in the way that global industries touch down in their local areas. By evaluating skill demand 
across related sectors, policy makers will be able to see how high- and low-skill, high- and low-
wage occupations are critical to supply chain competitiveness, motivating support for firms and 
workers in more vulnerable sectors. State and local economic development organizations can 
identify opportunities for these incumbent firms and workers to move into higher value-added 
positions. Workforce development organizations can complement this work by identifying 
rewarding career pathways across related sectors, drawing underutilized workers up (or down) 
the supply chain while building a talent pipeline behind them, even more effectively responding 
to industry requests to help fill high demand occupations. These actions would improve both the 
productivity and resilience of manufacturing supply chains. 
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Analysis of skill demand in a supply chain context also has the potential to sharpen 
industrial recruitment strategies.  States and local areas spend millions of dollars recruiting large, 
high profile, multinational firms to boost local employment and capacity for innovation, but the 
local impact on employment and innovation also depends on efforts to localize and develop the 
supply base of the large firms.  Greater familiarity with how skill demand is dispersed across a 
large firm’s intermediate goods suppliers will help local policy makers evaluate the potential for 
recruitment deals to benefit incumbent firms and workers.   
With both public- and private-sector-led skill development efforts in mind, this study 
presents a skill-centric analysis of publicly available data.  Input-output tables, industry and 
occupation matrices (“staffing patterns”), and descriptions of skill requirements by occupation 
are leveraged to identify related industries and analyze their skill levels.  This approach aims to 
motivate efforts to upgrade skills across related sectors.  It brings lower-tier sectors into focus 
where they might otherwise be ignored.   
The automotive industry is used as an illustrative case of how patterns in buyer-supplier 
relationships can affect the dispersal of skill and compensation across industries. The automotive 
supply chain (or “value chain”) follows distinct patterns in the dispersal of power, resources, 
flexibility, technology, and knowledge, generating activities that diverge from patterns in the 
aerospace, textile, or electronics industries. For example, automotive supply chains are generally 
organized around and coordinated by the producers of automobiles (e.g., Toyota, Ford) while 
apparel supply chains are generally coordinated by the buyers of manufactured products (e.g., 
Nike, Zara, Gap) (see Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994, for early conceptualizations of producer-
driven versus buyer-driven value chains).  
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For many reasons (primarily their brand control and direct relationship with consumers), 
automakers are particularly powerful clients and have historically captured most of the profits 
and produced most of the innovation in automotive supply chains.  With their powerful positions, 
automakers exert control over their supply chain partners to increase operational efficiency, 
demanding cost reductions and quality improvements. There are also many examples of 
automakers working collaboratively with their most strategic direct “Tier 1” suppliers, which 
produce sophisticated car components and systems such as drive trains, interior seating and 
consoles, and electrical systems. Lower-tier suppliers are more difficult to study or to connect 
directly to the automotive supply chain.  These are smaller, more diversified establishments 
producing smaller, less complex parts and services—metal or plastic parts that fit into larger 
components and systems—or related tools and machinery. 
The next section reviews the literature on the role of occupational skills in economic 
development.  The data and methods described in section three provide a generalized framework 
to advance a shared understanding of what it means to evaluate skill from a supply-chain-sector 
perspective, evaluating multiple measures of skill demand.  In the section following, I apply 
these methods to the automotive supply chain in the United States (or the U.S. automotive 
cluster), then report and discuss the results. I offer concluding remarks in the final section. 
Background 
Wilbur Thompson and Philip Thompson laid the conceptual framework for situating skill 
as a focus for economic development policy.  In their pioneering work (Thompson & Thompson, 
1987), they proposed a shift away from the targeting of monolithic industries for (any) jobs, 
introducing a method to identify and advance local comparative advantage, which they defined 
in terms of what people do (their occupations) rather than what they make (their industries).  
They proposed directing development efforts to the “functional [occupational] strengths of the 
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home locality” (Thompson & Thompson, 1987, p. 554) and claimed that these human resources 
would inform a local area’s ability to respond to technological change and global competition.   
In the 2000s, Ann Markusen and Ed Feser took up the mantle of occupational targeting, 
advancing the fruitful deployment of occupational databases.  Markusen (2004) highlighted how 
local concentrations of creative arts and design occupations could be targeted for development, 
enhancing an area’s unique occupational advantage.  Artists and designers seem to be mobile to 
the extent that they could be attracted and embedded in place, enhancing localization trends. 
Most importantly, art and design work provides an excellent example of how a local 
occupational strength could have a variety of industrial applications, and could range from low to 
high levels of compensation and job security. Similarly, Ed Feser (2003) provided economic 
development analysts with a technique to identify “knowledge-based clusters,” groups of 
occupations requiring similar substantive knowledge.  These mostly high-wage occupations 
support innovation in various knowledge-intensive industries. 
Further application of these occupational clustering techniques shows that occupational 
localization trends cannot be predicted by an area’s industry mix (Barbour & Markusen, 2007; 
Renski, Koo, & Feser, 2007), confirming that what people do is different than what people make.  
Therefore, targeting occupational clusters leads to different economic development strategies 
rather than focusing on industrial clusters alone (Markusen & Schrock, 2001).  
Occupational clustering techniques can prioritize different sets of shared underlying 
attributes.  For example, municipalities seeking to increase income tax revenues can aim to 
develop high-wage occupational clusters regardless of industry. For municipalities that are home 
to large populations of lower-wage workers, occupational clustering techniques can identify 
accessible career pathways across existing industry.  Recognizing that the “knowledge-based 
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clusters” proposed by Feser (2003) and Koo (2005) were not accessible to people in or near 
poverty, Chrisinger, Fowler, and Kleit (2012) identified clusters accessible to low-wage workers 
and argued that economic development centered on these clusters could boost growth and reduce 
poverty.  They highlighted the possibility of linking not only displaced workers to jobs requiring 
their skill profile but also linking workers stuck in dead-end jobs to better jobs in related fields, 
suggesting that workers can incrementally increase skills and compensation across occupations 
and industries when work at a single firm or in a single industry does not necessarily ensure 
advancement. Societal gains are maximized when job openings are accessible to low-wage 
workers and are paired with strategies that facilitate advancement (Nelson & Wolf-Powers, 
2010; Persky, Felsenstein, & Carlson, 2004). Fran Stewart (2017) showed that a higher density 
of jobs requiring technical skills (high STEM and low soft) was correlated with greater regional 
well-being, confirming the potential value of production and repair occupations and other 
accessible occupations identified by Chrisinger, Fowler, and Kleit (2012).  Associated with this 
work is the idea that workers increase their skills and their wages concurrently. 
This deep and instructive dive into the occupational analysis that Thompson and 
Thompson (1987) inspired has expanded our understanding of how occupations are connected to 
each other, how occupational trends differ from industrial trends, and how the two can be 
fruitfully cross-referenced.  We are now more fully prepared to further build our intuition 
regarding how compensation and skill requirements vary across industries, and to consider how 
patterns in buyer-supplier relationships affect the dispersal of both skill and compensation.   
A supply chain (or “value chain”) framework helps to identify actors with more (or less) 
resources and power, and more (or less) ability to utilize and advance the skills of existing 
industry. These dynamics vary by supply chain—automotive supply chain dynamics are different 
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than textile supply chain dynamics. Each of these globally competitive industries has complex 
and extended supply networks and follows a distinct pattern in the dispersal of power, resources, 
flexibility, technology, and knowledge-generating activities. The relationship between skills and 
wages is important to address in this context because supplier-buyer relationships structure 
investment opportunities and constraints.  A firm’s position in a supply chain (with one type of 
client), as well as across supply chains (diversified clients), determines its ability to negotiate for 
better contracts.  The nature of a contract, particularly if it is short term and cost reducing, can 
limit a firm’s ability to invest in new machinery and skilled labor (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 
20112; Helper et al., 2011; MacDuffie & Kochan, 1995; Theodore & Weber, 2001; Weber & 
Schnell, 2003).   
Identifying transferable occupational skills and occupational pathways across this 
increasingly fragmented industrial landscape3 can help prepare communities for technological 
and trade disruptions, which may affect local firms and may shift an area’s industrial profile. 
However, this approach has its limits, as many occupations and jobs are firmly embedded within 
the limits of existing industry, with few options for learning outside of the job site. What are the 
options for workers and communities attached to existing industry? Where will we learn the 
“versatility in skill and adaptability in behavior” that “ensures quicker and easier escape from 
adversity” (Thompson & Thompson, 1987, p. 559)? It is critical to understand how our 
                                                          
2 Barrientos, Gereffi, and Rossi (2011) describe a variety of labor impacts (voice/representation, safety, wages) from 
cost reduction pressures and quality expectations created by large, lead firms in their supply chains. They 
conceptualize the distribution of skill requirements in global industries. 
3 It is broadly recognized that it is harder today for many workers to advance within one company or even one 
industry than it was 30 years ago.  Most companies are no longer vertically integrated and are no longer performing 




communities are situated vis-à-vis local industry, global industries, and the supply chains that 
inform our options for skill upgrading. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, scholars began to look closely at how the structure of global 
supply chains (or “value chains”) shape opportunities and challenges for local area upgrading 
(Dicken, 1992; Gereffi, 1999; Henderson, Dicken, Hess, Coe, & Yeung, 2002; see also Gereffi, 
Fernandez-Stark, & Psilos, 2011 regarding workforce development). An important observation 
and critique is that workers do not always benefit from firm or area upgrading (Barrientos, 
2007).  The quality of jobs created by global trade is highly variable, with some jobs requiring 
specific skills and paying decent wages, and others characterized by extremely low levels of 
commitment by employers and high flexibility demanded of workers with low pay (Barrientos, 
Mayer, Pickles, & Posthuma, 2011; see also Kalleberg, 2011 for similar trends in reference to 
financialization in the United States).  Barrientos identified that different supply chains (or 
“value chains”) have unique patterns of skill dispersal and different trajectories for increasing 
wages, labor rights, and job security, based in part on variations in cost and quality demands 
(Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011). 
This work to identify tradeoffs between development trajectories is increasingly 
important when the institutions that have traditionally rewarded skills with higher wages are 
weakened. Larger firms are generally better positioned than smaller firms to pay their workers 
better wages (Brown, Hamilton, & Medoff, 1990; Harrison, 1994), but have outsourced parts 
production and related employment to suppliers. National governments’ role in preserving 
national interests and enforcing labor standards is diminished as corporations increasingly 
operate across international boundaries and local suppliers make employment decisions in 
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response to the requirements of their multinational clients (Barrientos, Mayer, Pickles, & 
Posthuma, 2011).  
In general, global competition and the outsourcing activities of multinational corporations 
seem to push cost reduction burdens to firms further down the supply chain. Small firms in lower 
tiers of the supply chain may be particularly constrained in their ability to provide quality jobs 
and job training. Smaller firms in the United States not only pay lower wages, but also invest less 
in training (Black & Lynch, 1996; Brown, Hamilton, & Medoff, 1990; Harrison, 1994; Lynch & 
Black, 1998; Osterman, 1995).  In 2014, Paul Osterman and Andrew Weaver found that skill 
shortages were overstated in general, but where they exist may be more acutely felt among 
smaller firms (Osterman & Weaver, 2014).   
Consequently, smaller firms likely have difficulty taking advantage of local labor pools.  
Chrisinger, Fowler, and Kleit (2012) suggested that local labor pools of low-wage workers 
should be the subjects of economic development efforts to reduce poverty. They leave us asking 
how we can increase the number of accessible occupations.   
Many states and local areas are also asking how they can invest in people and skills to 
fortify and restore manufacturing capabilities, rather than place bets on individual companies or 
invest only in high-skill, high-wage workers. For labor market participants that are not as 
entrepreneurial or as mobile as Markusen’s artists or Feser’s knowledge workers, occupational 
development needs to start with an accurate assessment of where investments in occupational 
skills will be rewarded. For workers whose labor market entry or re-entry is at stake, we know 
that education and training programs cannot be separated from work opportunities4 and work 
                                                          
4 Investments in training and education should be informed by labor market data regarding work and wages, 
including employment projections, and conducted in partnership with employers to ensure students and employees 
are receiving the most up-to-date training.  Whenever possible, job seekers should be connected to employer-led 
training programs that lead directly to employment or advancement.  These short-term programs should also be 
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opportunities cannot be separated from industrial trends, including the way the states and local 
areas are situated vis-à-vis global industries, global trade, and the powerful dynamics of supply 
chains.   
With the “cross-hairs” of industrial and occupational analysis in focus (Thompson & 
Thompson, 1987, p. 547), this study introduces a related-industries approach and supply chain 
framework to evaluate skill dispersal and its compensation in the U.S. automotive cluster.  
Data and Methods 
The following analysis uses data on industries, occupations, and occupational skill 
requirements to map skill in a manufacturing supply chain, specifically the skill needed to 
manufacture the materials and parts that make up passenger vehicles.5 The data sources will be 
familiar to economic analysts. Some of the data sources used in this analysis have been in use for 
decades, reoriented over and again to new priorities and paradigms.  Introduced by economist 
Wassily Leontief in the 1940s, input-output tables aim to capture all economic transactions in the 
economy.  They underlie much modern economic analysis, including industrial cluster studies 
(see Delgado, Porter, & Stern, 2015) and research on international trade (see Timmer, 
Dietzenbacher, Los, Stehrer, & de Vries, 2015).  National input-output tables provide the basic 
information underlying economic impact studies produced by the IMPLAN and RIMS impact 
estimation tools (IMPLAN, 2017; U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017).   
This analysis uses the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Input-Output Tables to 
identify supply chain relationships, and their intensity and direction.  These tables, the result of 
                                                          
sensitive to longer term skill demand and help ensure the labor market is resilient to change and can move to 
opportunity. 




an impressive data collection program detailed in “The Input-Output Handbook” (Horowitz & 
Planting, 2009), capture transactional economic relationships between industries in a static 
representation of supply chains, a snapshot of relationships at one point in time. The major 
limitation of the BEA Input-Output Tables, for present purposes, is that the most recent year that 
data are available for detailed industry codes (“benchmark tables”)—using 6-digit codes in the 
North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS)—is 2007.  These benchmark tables 
are updated every 5 years.  The 2007 data were released in 2015 and the 2012 data were not 
available at the time of publication.   
Because the detailed “benchmark” (6-digit NAICS level) input-output tables for 2012 
were not available, it is worth considering how the massively disruptive 2007-2012 automotive 
crisis and recession years might have shifted economic transactions between industries.  Indeed, 
one of the reasons given for the bailout was the dependence of automakers on a shared supply 
chain.  The concern was that if one automaker failed, its suppliers might have been unable to 
sustain operations and might have failed to provide key inputs to other automakers, causing their 
subsequent failure and magnifying the recession.  While complete system failure was avoided, 
there were bankruptcies, mergers, and acquisitions among Tier 1 suppliers. The shifts apparent in 
the annual tables (2-digit NAICS level) from 2007 to 2012 are not consequential for the present 
analysis, in part because the Tier 1 suppliers are grouped together and thus we do not observe the 
intra-tier changes.6 As readers are aware, the underlying industry dynamics and relationships are 
constantly evolving. 
                                                          
6 The 2007 to 2012 period was highly disruptive to the U.S. automotive industry, but any structural change is not 
apparent when using the annual BEA national input-output Direct Requirement and Use tables to compare 2007 to 
2012. This is likely because the high level of industry aggregation at three-digit NAICS code level masks intra-
industry dynamics. According to the tables, during this period gross operating surplus for Automakers and Tier 1 
suppliers (3361MV) is reduced, with reduced internal spending and reduced spending on all other manufacturing. 
Reductions are evenly spread across industries except with a slightly larger drop in spending on primary metal 
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The U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment 
Statistics (BLS OES) occupation data are often used in studies of occupational trends and 
occupational clusters (Markusen & Schrock, 2001; Feser, 2003; Koo, 2005; Renski, Koo, & 
Feser, 2007; Chrisinger, Fowler, & Kleit, 2012).  In this analysis, the BLS OES national reports 
by industry (“staffing patterns”) are used to define the occupational mix of individual industries.  
The major limitation with this data source is that, for most industries, the industry-specific 
national- and state-level occupational profiles are only available at the level of 4-digit NAICS.  I 
accept the generalization of occupational mix to the level of 4-digit NAICS, as this is an 
improvement over many industry studies that generalize at the 2- and 3-digit level. The 
limitation is further explored in the “Discussion of Data Limitations” section below.  
Each occupation included in the occupational mix from the OES national reports by 
industry is matched to its skill profile in the extensive O*NET OnLine database (O*NET, 2017).  
Designed to help students and workers evaluate the training and career path that is right for them, 
the O*NET database describes the skills needed for each of the 800+ detailed occupations.  The 
O*NET database contains measures of required education, related work experience, on-the-job 
training, STEM skills, and applied learning in a classroom setting provided by an employer, as 
well as measures that help an individual evaluate “fit” in an occupation (abilities, interests, tasks, 
etc.).  Incumbent workers and occupational experts evaluate and re-evaluate a portion of the skill 
measures every year and each occupational profile is updated about every 5 years. 
Education is a common proxy for skill.  While this is a valuable measure, it does not 
capture all aspects of the “skill” construct.  In this analysis, I am concerned with two measures of 
                                                          
manufacturing (331), a one percent drop. Imports of 3361MV are also reduced, exports increase, and domestic 
output increases slightly. The more detailed 2012 benchmark tables were not available at the time of publication. 
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job-related skill requirements, education and experience, which are used to assess two different 
aspects of the broader construct of “skill.”  












(DR) Table  





2007 BEA national Input-Output Tables 
track trade between U.S. industries 
by detailed (6-digit) NAICS codes: 
each industry’s role as a commodity 
producer and consumer (their 
relationships to each other as buyers 
and sellers of materials and parts).  
Tables used are after redefinition of 
secondary commodities. 
– Percent 
spending on input 
industries. 
– Total output and 














2016 The Occupational Employment 
Statistics (OES) program conducts a 
semiannual mail survey of 
approximately 200,000 nonfarm 
establishments per panel (every 6 
months), taking 3 years to fully 
collect the sample of 1.2 million 
establishments, to estimate 
employment and wages for workers 
in 800 occupations.  Occupational 
data are organized by North 
American Industry Classification 
System (NAICS) industry codes to 








wages.   







2016 The O*NET database contains 
hundreds of standardized and 
occupation-specific descriptors on 
almost 1,000 occupations covering 
the entire U.S. economy.  Every 
occupation requires a different mix 
of knowledge, skills, and abilities, 
and is performed using a variety of 
activities and tasks.  Initially 
populated by data collected from 
occupation analysts, it is updated by 
ongoing surveys of incumbent 













For present purposes, a major advantage of combining the BLS OES and O*NET skill 
measures is that O*NET skill measures are based on the actual tasks that occupations require—
the education levels and experience levels workers must have on the first day of work in a 
specific occupation—not necessarily the education held by current employees in those 
occupations or employer preferences. Other similar sources not used in this analysis would be 
useful for other purposes. For example, information gained in surveys of the general population 
(e.g., U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey or Current Population Survey) is useful 
for reporting on the education levels of incumbent workers currently in an occupation, which 
may reflect supply as much as demand. Job postings that are aggregated into databases by 
Wanted Analytics and other companies are also resources for information on occupations and 
their skill demands, but these reflect employer preferences (see Wardrip, Fee, Nelson, & 
Andreason, 2015 for a discussion of how employers’ occupational requirements vary by region 
and labor supply). 
The O*NET database also includes a unique job preparation measure (“Job Zone”) based 
on an evaluation of overall preparation needed for an occupation, considering the required 
education and experience of workers and other measures of skill (O*NET, 2017).  See Table 2 
for a description of this measure. It is important to note that Job Zone 3 is the highest-level job 
zone applied to any production or repair occupations (occupational groups 49 and 51 in terms of 
Standard Occupational Classification [SOC] codes); this level usually requires 3 to 4 years of 
formal or informal apprenticeship in a trade.  Job Zone 1 is the lowest level: few if any 
educational requirements and little if any previous experiences are needed.  Job Zone 2 jobs 
usually require a high school education and some unrelated work experience. 
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It is worth noting that Job Zone 3 includes many of the “apprenticeable” trades and 
“middle skill” jobs that have been identified as in demand by various advocacy, trade, and 
industry associations, and academics (e.g., machinists and other skilled production occupations) 
(see Lerman, 2013). 
Table 2. O*NET Measures of Skill, Categorization for this Study 
Type of Skill 
Required Measurement of Skill Requirement by O*NET Author’s Measure 
Education Six categories: did not complete high school, high 
school GED or diploma, some college, bachelor’s 





than a high school 
GED or diploma 
Related work 
experience 
Five categories: none, less than 1 year experience, 
1 to 4 years, 4 to 8 years, more than 8 years 
Percent of jobs 
requiring more 
than 1 year of 
related experience 
Job zone Five categories: Job Zones 1 (lowest preparation 
required) to 5 (highest preparation required) for all 
occupations; production occupations only 
categorized as 1, 2, or 3 
Percent of jobs 
categorized as 
levels 3, 4, or 5 
 
Grouping Industries (Supply Sectors) into Supply Tiers 
In automotive industry studies, it is important to distinguish between automakers and 
their suppliers. This analysis starts with passenger cars and light trucks as the end products in the 
automotive supply chain and then identifies related industries in the supply chain (industries that 
contain establishments providing key inputs or “supply sectors”).  The 2007 BEA Input-Output 
Tables and BLS OES staffing patterns data distinguish automakers (NAICS 3361) from their 
primary systems and parts suppliers (NAICS 3363) within the 336 NAICS group for 
Transportation Equipment Manufacturing.   
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The buyer/supplier relationships between industries establish the intensity and direction 
of trade using two measures: a measure of spending by automakers on the product/industry from 
the BEA Input-Output Tables, Direct Requirements Table; and a measure of how much of an 
industry’s output was utilized by the automotive sector from the Use Table.  In this analysis, 
industries are considered “supply sectors” if they are receiving more than 1% of spending by 
automakers and their first-tier supply sectors (or more than ~$2.5 billion annually), or if they are 
sending more than 50% of their output to automakers and their first-tier supply sectors.  These 
supply sectors are organized into “supply tiers” or Tier 1 and Tier 2 supply sectors.  Tier 1 
supply sectors are those on which original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and their final 
assembly plants rely the most.  Tier 2 supply sectors are those on which Tier 1 supply sectors 
rely the most.  Note that for illustrative and analytical purposes, only two tiers are evaluated, but 
this obscures several intra-tier economic transactions as companies in Tiers 1 and 2 buy and sell 
to each other within as well as across tiers. 
Analyzing Skill by Supply Tier 
Each 4-digit NAICS code identified as representing a supply sector is matched to its BLS 
OES national staffing pattern (or state staffing pattern for state-level analysis).  Stripping the data 
to retain only the detailed occupation categories (6-digit SOC codes), each detailed occupation 
category is matched to data on skill requirements from the O*NET database.  I present education 
and experience requirements by supply tier.  Focusing then on production occupations only, 
which include both production and repair occupations (occupational groups 49 and 51 in terms of 
SOC codes), results also include the percent of occupations categorized as O*NET Job Zone 3. 
Discussion of Data Limitations 
The first major limitation is that the BLS OES data linking industries and occupations, or 
the staffing patterns data, are only available at the 4-digit NAICS level, meaning that data on 
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economic transactions at the 6-digit level (e.g., in the BLS input-output tables) are not utilized.  
This is the most detailed level available for staffing patterns by industry.  Regardless of the 
industry-level detail, using industry data means that establishments participating in automotive 
production are lumped together with establishments that are not participating in automotive 
production.  Establishment level differences are obscured.  In representing skill demand across a 
supply sector, I assume that automotive-serving establishments have similar staffing patterns as 
non-automotive-serving establishments, or that automotive-serving establishments are evenly 
distributed around the industry average. 
Another data limitation is that information on occupational skill requirements in O*NET 
do not vary by industry or by establishment; industry- and establishment-level differences are 
obscured.  I assume that occupations have similar skill requirements across industries, as well as 
across automotive-serving and non-automotive-serving establishments within the same industry.  
This means that I assume that the job of maintenance technician requires the same level of 
education and experience on day 1, regardless of whether the maintenance technician is starting a 
job at an automaker’s vehicle assembly plant with a sophisticated teamwork organization and 
emphasis on quality production or starting at another manufacturing firm, which may have less 
sophisticated systems. 
In spite of these limitations, the proposed framework is useful, in part to structure and 
motivate research into these assumptions. 
Supply Tier Skill Estimates 
Grouping Industries into Supply Tiers 
Automakers and Tier 1 supply sectors are highly interdependent in their trading 
relationships (see Table 3).  Automakers are supplied by more than 200 industries but seven of 
these industries receive 46% of the automakers’ spending.  These seven industries—
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manufacturing of steering, engine, transmission, exterior, interior, electrical, and related parts 
and systems—make up Tier 1 supply sectors.  These sectors are highly committed to automotive 
production, with 59% of their total output going to automakers or other companies in Tier 1 (Tier 
1 companies sell to each other as well as to automakers).  Spending by automakers and Tier 1 on 
Tier 1 supply sectors totals $135.2 billion. 
Tier 1 includes many of the global suppliers that increasingly provide whole systems or 
“modules” of vehicles to final assembly plants.  For companies in Tier 1, global sales can reach 
$45 billion annually (Automotive News, 2016).  Companies include multinational firms Bosch 
(headquartered in Germany) and Denso (headquartered in Japan).  These are assumed to have 
sophisticated establishments producing complex parts using advanced technology.   
Research on the global automotive industry suggests that interdependence between 
automakers and Tier 1 suppliers is an increasing global trend, and also that Tier 1 operations are 
increasingly consolidated though mergers and acquisitions (Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, & 
Gereffi, 2008). Research on U.S. supply chain relations does not contradict this observation but 
focuses instead on the different levels of collaboration and trust between supply chain partners 
and trends led by individual automakers (MacDuffie & Helper, 2007).   
Table 3 displays the basic information on supply tiers.  The first and second columns 
describe the supply tier; the third describes the industries included.  The amount of spending by 
the automotive sector and the percent of the industry’s total output that goes to automotive 
production are in columns 4 and 5. Average establishment size and total employment are listed in 
columns 6 and 7.  We can see that a single automaker establishment might make a big 
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employment impact on a local area, but the combined related employment in Tier 1 and Tier 2 
supply sectors is greater.7   
Tier 2 establishments tend to be smaller, but there are more of them.  These include metal 
and plastic parts providers.  The automotive industry is known to be demanding in its quality and 
cost expectations, expectations that are passed down through supply chain tiers from the 
automakers.  Lower tier suppliers have few opportunities to become direct suppliers to 
automakers, given the dynamics of the first tier (Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, & Gereffi, 2008). 
Table 3. Supply Sector Tiers: Automakers, Tier 1, Tier 2 Supply Sectors 



































3363 $464.2 59% 102 352,398 
2 Parts mfg. variousd $430.0 13% 39 305,111 
Source: U.S. BEA Input-Output Tables, 2007; U.S. BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 2016. 
a Calculated based on industry output (BEA Input-Output Direct Requirements Table). 
b Percent of the industry that is allocated to produce cars or car parts (BEA Input-Output Use Table).   
c Employment is weighted for each industry included in the tier by percent of the industry output going to 
automakers and Tier 1 industries.   
d Industries in Tier 2: NAICS 3261, 3311, 3315, 3321, 3327, 3336, 3344. 
 
                                                          
7 There are several small establishments that are included in the associated NAICS code (3361) that are indeed 
Original Equipment Manufacturers that produce race cars and small vehicles in low volume and do not provide a 
similar product to the large Automakers.  Ninety percent of all Automakers’ employees are employed at 
establishments (manufacturing plants or offices) with more than 1,000 workers; half of all employees in Tier 1 are 
employed at establishments with more than 500 workers (BLS Quarterly Census on Employment and Wages, 2016). 
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In Table 3, Tier 2 supply sectors are distinguished by their trading relationships with 
automakers and Tier 1 sectors.8 Automakers and Tier 1 companies spend $429.6 billion on 
companies in Tier 2.  However, a majority of this spending is by Tier 1, not automakers, 
revealing that Tier 1 plays an important role in consolidating parts and services from other 
suppliers of manufactured goods.   
Tier 2 companies provide intermediate inputs to a greater diversity of end products 
compared to Tier 1, which is highly dedicated to and dependent on automotive industry 
purchases.  Only 13% of Tier 2 output goes to automotive production (see Table 3).  
Education and Experience in Automotive Supply Tiers 
Tier 1 supply sectors require higher levels of education and experience than automakers, 
based on the required education and experience levels of their total personnel, including 
administrative, design, sales, engineering, production, and transportation positions.  Tier 1 
supply sectors employ a higher percentage of engineers than do automakers—8% versus 4% of 
total jobs—contributing to their higher overall skill estimates (BLS OES, 2016).  These results 
may be surprising for those of us that think of automakers as driving innovation in the 
automotive industry and therefore possessing most of the important skills for manufacturing 
process and product innovation.   
                                                          
8 NAICS 3363 industries constitute Tier 1; plastic, primary metal, metal product, machinery, computer and 
electronics parts manufacturing sectors are included in Tier 2.  Given the complexity of identifying suppliers at 
lower tiers of the supply chain, studies often limit their analysis of the automotive industry to the NAICS codes that 
are most directly related: those that begin with 3363.  There are seven detailed NAICS categories that begin with 
3363 and represent major blocks of firms and establishments that serve in the top tiers of the automotive value 
chain.  Studies that go beyond the 3361 and 3363 NAICS codes to examine the role of other related industries in the 
automotive supply chain examine a few but not all the codes included here (NAICS 3261, 3311, 3315, 3321, 3327, 
3336, 3344).  Helper et al. (2011) include companies from NAICS 3261, 3262, 3321, 3327, 3335 and 3362 in their 
survey of U.S. automotive parts suppliers.  Delgado, Porter and Stern (2015) include industries from NAICS 3315, 
3321, 3362 and 3369 in their definition of the automotive industry cluster. 
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Large firms invest the most in research and development and are granted the greatest 
gross number of patents; also, they can often adapt to control the highest value-added activities 
in the supply chain such as the research, design, and development of new products.  However, 
we also know that many large firm capabilities, skills, and knowledge are retained at 
headquarters locations while satellite offices and branch plants apply more codified best 
practices to their specialized work.  Further, on a global scale, automakers share research and 
development, design, and production risks and opportunities with their first-tier suppliers 
(Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, & Gereffi, 2008, p. 305-307).  
In fact, automotive parts suppliers, both Tier 1 and Tier 2 sectors, require a higher level 
of “skill,” as measured by either education or experience, than automakers.  Tables 4 and 5 
compare basic skill measures for supply tiers—measures of education, experience, and (in Table 
5) O*NET’s Job Zone 3, categorization: Table 4 for all positions and Table 5 for production 
positions.9 The differences in production worker skills across supply chain tiers are more 
pronounced. 
Table 4. Measures of Skill Required of All Workers by Supply Chain Tier 
 Percent of all positions requiring… 
… more than a high 
school education 
… more than 1 year 
related work experience 
Automakers 27% 41% 
Tier 1 supply sectors 40% 56% 
Tier 2 supply sectors 43% 60% 
Source: Author’s analysis of BLS OES (2016), O*NET (2017). 
                                                          
9 Production workers constitute 81 percent of Automakers’ employees, 65 percent of Tier 1 employees, and 40 to 80 




Tier 2 includes smaller establishments likely producing smaller, less sophisticated parts 
than Tier 1, but Tier 2 skill measures are almost as high or higher than Tier 1 for all personnel 
and production positions.  In Table 5, Tier 2 stands out as requiring the highest percentage of 
skilled production workers as measured by the comprehensive Job Zone 3 category.  This 
measure is particularly well suited to measure skills required in manufacturing as it includes 
skills acquired through experience, education, and on-the-job training. 
Table 5. Measures of Skill Required of Production Workers by Supply Chain Tier 
 Percent of all positions requiring… 
… more than a high 
school education 
… more than 1 year 
related work 
experience 
…Job Zone 3 skills 
Automakers 9% 23% 10% 
Tier 1 supply sectors 12% 41% 24% 
Tier 2 supply sectors 14% 47% 31% 
Source: Author’s analysis of BLS OES (2016), O*NET (2017). 
 
The estimates for Tier 2 supply sector skills are based on averages across seven very 
different industries.  To focus in on Tier 2, Table 6 displays skill measure results for industries 
included in Tier 2, showing little variation in the measure of education, a lot of variation in the 
experience measure, and a moderate amount of variation in the Job Zone 3 percentage.  Some 
supply sectors require much higher levels of skill (see the results for “3327 – Machine Shops” in 
Table 6); other supply sectors require lower levels of skill (see the results for “3261 – Plastic 




Table 6. Measures of Skill Required of Production Workers 
for Industries Included in Tier 2 
Industries included in 
Tier 2 supply sector 
Percent of production positions requiring… 
… more than a high 
school education 
… more than 1 year 
related work 
experience 
…Job Zone 3 skills 
3311 – Iron & Steel 
Mills 14% 50% 32% 
3315 - Foundries  14% 45% 24% 
3321 – Forging & 
Stamping 14% 52% 31% 
3327 – Machine Shops 17% 58% 61% 
3344 – Semiconductor 
… Mfg. 14% 39% 15% 
3336 – Engine & 
Turbine Machinery 14% 49% 37% 
3261 – Plastic Products 
Mfg. 11% 41% 16% 
Source: Author’s analysis of BLS OES (2016), O*NET (2017). 
 
Underlying the difference in skill levels estimated for supply chain sectors are the 
different mixes of production occupations, shown in Table 7 for automakers, Tier 1, and two 
examples of industries (one higher skill, one lower skill) from Tier 2.  The high percentages of 
skilled tradesmen employed in Tiers 1 and 2 contributes to the high skill measures.  Computer-
controlled machine tool operators, machinists, machine maintenance, and tool and die positions 
are designated as Job Zone 3, requiring the top level of preparation among production positions.  
These are in-demand occupations that increasingly require experience in mechatronics and 
advanced materials.  As Table 7 depicts, some of the industries included in Tier 2 have a very 
high percent of skilled tradesmen. 
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Table 7. Variation in Occupational Mix by Supply Sector: Auto Assembly, Tier 1, Example 
Industries from Tier 2 
















Assemblers, Supervisors 83% 44% 12% 25% 
Machine Maintenance 4% 7% 2% 8% 
Computer-Controlled Machine Tool 
Op. 0% 4% 14% 2% 
Machine Setters and Operators 7% 18% 14% 45% 
Machinists 0% 5% 39% 2% 
Tool and Die Makers 1% 3% 1% 1% 
Welders, Cutters, Solderers, and 
Brazers 0% 3% 5% 0% 
Inspectors, Testers, Sorters… 3% 5% 5% 6% 
Other 2% 11% 8% 11% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: Author’s analysis of BLS OES (2016). 
 
Eighty-three percent of production workers employed by automakers are not skilled 
tradesmen but rather are experts in assembly (“team assemblers”).  These positions generally 
require a high school education and less than 1 year of related experience, if any at all.  
Similarly, machine setters and operators employed by automakers (7% of total production 
occupations) require a similar level of education and experience.  Supervisors of team assemblers 
are registered as Job Zone 3, not because they require more education but because these jobs 
require more experience and social skills.   
Education, Experience, and Wage Estimates 
This skill-centric analysis of trading relationships between industries in the automotive 
supply chain begs the question of how skills are rewarded across supply chain sectors.  Given the 
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high level of skill required by Tier 1 and Tier 2, in comparison to automakers, it is surprising to 
see in Figures 1 and 2 that workers’ wages in these tiers are lower.  Based on national and state-
level wage estimates, wages seem not to vary with skill measures but rather with supply tier, in 
the opposite direction as skill intensity.  Figures 1 and 2 show the skill measures and wage 
estimates for all workers (Figure 1) and production workers (Figure 2). 
Figure 1. Skill Measures by Supply Chain Tier - All Automotive Workers  




Figure 2. Skill Measures by Supply Chain Tier – Automotive Production Workers 
Source: Author’s analysis of BEA Input-Output Tables, BLS OES (2016) O*NET (2017). 
 
These wage estimates suggest that skill is potentially unrecognized or undervalued in 
Tiers 1 and 2; or, similarly, that workers and firms lack the power to negotiate for wages that 
reflect their skill levels.  In general, we know that automakers generally provide good jobs with 
higher wages and lower educational barriers to entry where workers are organized and bargain 
collectively with their employer, while other automakers raise wages and maintain job quality to 
remain competitive in the labor market and to avoid union organizing (Brown, Hamilton, & 
Medoff, 1990, p. 30-32, 38-40).   
It may also be difficult for lower-tier supply sectors to raise wages if constrained by their 
contracts.  Lower-tier companies might have more precarious contracts with their clients with 
few channels to communicate or capture opportunities to secure greater profit margins.  In this 
way, the power dynamics in the supply chain may suppress the wages of workers in lower-tier 
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supply sectors.  It is also likely that the supply chain structure allows automakers to capture more 
profits and to increase workers’ wages sufficiently to reduce recruitment and retention costs and 
stabilize their workforce (how firms reduce turnover with efficiency wages in Osterman, 1995, p. 
136).   
One also must consider whether supply chain position is being conflated with 
establishment size: establishments in Tier 1 are smaller on average than automakers’ 
establishments and establishments in Tier 2 are smaller on average than those in Tier 1. 
Table 8. Wage Estimates by Supply Chain Tier – All Positions and Production Positions 
NAICS description NAICS codes 
U.S. average 
hourly wage  
all positions 
U.S. average 
hourly wage  
production 
positions 
Automakers 3361 $26.50 $24.08 
Tier 1 supply sectors 3363 $22.27 $18.51 
Tier 2 supply sectors (several) $24.74 $18.64 
Employment services 5613 $18.22 $13.92 
Source: BLS OES (2016). 
 
The skill and wage levels of production workers in employment services are included in 
Table 8 as a reference.  Employment services tends to employ temporary workers with short-
term contracts and lower wages, representing a previously recognized lower segment of the 
workforce (Kalleberg, 2000; Peck & Theodore, 1998) utilized by automotive companies to 
increase flexibility during expansions and downsizing and in tight labor markets (Barrientos, 
Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011; Houseman, Kalleberg, & Erickcek, 2003).  The input-output tables show 
that automakers spend about one tenth of a percent of their budget on Employment Services 
(NAICS 561300).  Tier 1 supply sectors spend a slightly higher percentage than automakers, and 
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Tier 2 supply sectors spend a slightly higher percentage than Tier 1—but this also reflects that 
these lower tier sectors spend a greater percentage of their budget on all services due to smaller 
economies of scale (author’s interpretation of BEA input-output tables).   
The majority of production workers in Employment Services are in assembly positions, 
suggesting they are likely utilized by automakers and Tier 1 suppliers.  The nature of temporary 
help services allows automakers to hire workers during production peaks and let them go when 
production slows (Barrientos, Gereffi, & Rossi, 2011) and adds flexibility in tight labor markets 
(Houseman, Kalleberg, & Erickcek, 2003).  It allows automakers to screen workers for full 
employment, observing them for 6 months, for example, before offering them a more permanent 
position.   
It is possible that the low wages of the production workers in Employment Services are 
the result of other low wage industry demand.  But if we accept that automakers also pay much 
lower wages to temporary workers than to regular production workers, then here are several 
possible conclusions, given the wage differential.  One, that wages reflect skill levels: lower skill 
levels are required during production peaks to augment production, and, if a temporary worker is 
offered a permanent position, it is because she has gained or has potential to gain critical skills 
during the 6 months or so of observation.  Two, wages reflect the bargaining power of labor in 
large firms and higher unionization rates or automakers’ unique position in the supply chain and 
their ability to spend to retain their key production staff.  If a temporary worker is offered a 
permanent position, her wages increase, not in relation to skill, but in relation to institutional 
dynamics. 
In summary, a variety of advantages accrue to automakers.  Size, brand name 
recognition, and supply chain control allow automakers to accrue greater revenues and spend 
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more per worker, regardless of workers’ skill levels.  Their many advantages might lead to 
segmentation in the labor market whereby smaller and lower-tier firms are unable to compete 
with automakers for labor but may compete with each other where co-located. 
Skill in the Automotive Supply Chain: State Examples 
To investigate the variation in skill measures by state, I chose one state in North 
America’s automotive industry core and one in the periphery.  Michigan, specifically the Detroit 
region, has long been the center of automotive industry research, design, development, and 
production, and hosts the North American headquarters of the Big Three and many other U.S. 
and foreign firms.  Alabama is in the manufacturing periphery, with younger assembly and parts 
manufacturing plants, similar to other U.S. southern and Mexican states that welcomed foreign 
direct investment in the 1980s and 1990s.   
In both states, as at the national level, Tier 2 requires the highest percentage of highly 
skilled production workers (Job Zone 3), Tier 1 is in the middle, and automakers require the 
lowest percentage of highly skilled production workers (see Table 9).10  This is despite 
differences in state population and automotive employment shares. As discussed above, these 
measures result from automakers’ reliance on assembly line positions and Tier 2 industries that 
rely heavily on skilled trades. 
I observed some state-level differences in the skill required by Michigan and Alabama 
establishments.  Alabama’s Tier 1 supply sectors have a comparatively lower percentage of 
highly skilled workers, compared to results in Michigan and to the national results.  This 
                                                          
10 Alabama hosts the vehicle assembly branch plants of Mercedes-Benz (opened 1997), Honda (opened 2001) and 
Hyundai (opened 2005).  Alabama population is about half that of Michigan (roughly 5 million vs 10 million); 
employment at Automakers in Alabama is a little more than one third of Michigan’s employment at Automakers 
(13,083 vs 36,720 workers); employment in Tier 1 is roughly one fifth (25,533 vs 125,789). 
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suggests that the dedicated automotive parts and systems being built in Alabama are less skill 
intensive, or rather that the occupation mix there requires fewer highly skilled and experienced 
tradespeople.  I also note that production workers in Alabama’s Employment Services sector are 
less concentrated in higher skill occupations (Job Zone 3), and thus the wage differential 
between employment at automakers and at Employment Services is much larger.  Although 
automakers use temporary help agencies and other employment services, the lower wage might 
also reflect that several other industries are utilizing Employment Services for lower-skill and 
lower-wage production work in Alabama, or that automakers are not using these services as 
much in Alabama as in other states.   
Wage estimates by tier are shown for Michigan and Alabama in Table 10.  In both states, 
as at the national level, automakers have the highest wages; however, as with Tier 1 skill 
measures, Tier 1 wage estimates vary by state.  In Alabama, Tier 1 wage estimates (and skill 
measures) are lower than Tier 2; in Michigan, Tier 1 wages estimates (and skill measures) are 
greater than Tier 2.  These results suggest different levels of wage-setting power, institutional 
differences, and differences in the supply chain position of Tier 1 companies in each state.  The 
historical patterns of how Tier 1 suppliers have chosen their locations to serve various 
automakers in the region would also be a factor in the divergent skill levels and wage rates.  It is 
interesting to see that wages might drop with skill levels within this supply tier, indicating that 
skills and wages may have a more typical relationship within individual industries or tiers than 




Table 9. Measure of Skill Required of Production Workers by 
Supply Sector Tier – Michigan and Alabama 
 Percent production positions 
requiring 
Job Zone 3 skills 
Michigan Alabama 
Automakers 11% 10% 
Tier 1 supply sectors 19% 14% 
Tier 2 supply sectors 31% 30% 
Employment services 15% 9% 
Sources: BLS OES (2016), O*NET (2017). 
 
Table 10. Estimated Wages for Production Workers by Supply 
Sector Tier – Michigan and Alabama. 
 
State average hourly wage -  
production positions 
Michigan Alabama 
Automakersa $25.19 $23.84 
Tier 1 supply sectors $19.86 $16.19 
Tier 2 supply sectors $17.83 $19.00 
Employment services $13.58 $12.17 
Source: BLS OES (2016). 
a Repair and maintenance positions excluded due to data suppression in one state. 
 
Conclusion 
An analysis of skill by industry in a supply chain perspective advances our understanding 
of skill beyond the level of a single organization or a labor market, raising our awareness of how 
local and nonlocal relationships between firms structure the location and valuation of skill across 
a supply chain.  In the case of the U.S. automotive industry, I observe the strong interdependence 
between automakers, Tier 1, and Tier 2 supply sectors, not only in their direct economic 
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transactions but also in the distribution of skill between the tiers.  I observe that skill 
requirements are higher in Tier 1 and Tier 2 supply sectors than for automakers.  I also observe 
that wages vary with supply chain tier but in the opposite direction as skill requirements, 
demonstrating that average compensation levels do not necessarily reflect the required skill 
levels of workers.   
One should be cautious drawing conclusions, as these observations are based on a 
descriptive presentation of industry averages based on population estimates, and I do not have 
accurate industry-level data on the skills that are required.  Importantly, the results gloss over 
issues that qualitative and survey-based research has emphasized: primarily, the degree to which 
there is variation in work organization that might affect staffing patterns and occupational 
requirements.  For example, larger firms are more likely to adopt measurable high-performance 
workplace practices, but how that affects measures of workers’ skill levels on Day 1 or Day 100 
is not well established.  The uptake of best practices in work organization (e.g., collaborative 
work teams, an emphasis on problem solving) may not be correlated with traditional measures of 
skill, such as education and experience.  
Local workforce and economic development practitioners who have one-on-one 
relationships with employers might further explore these questions with employers, perhaps 
opening the door for new skill upgrading initiatives.  Answering questions on the future of work, 
regarding the pace of technology adoption and its impact on work requirements, depends not 
only on recognizing where skill has been located but also how it might be re-located in supply 




A few questions naturally follow from the finding that automotive supply chains seem to 
rely on skilled tradesmen concentrated in lower tiers, and yet their skill and experience is not 
generously compensated.  What type of skill and experience is the most valuable?  Are some 
skills gained through experience undervalued, underutilized, or somehow not worth 
compensating?  The global value chain literature suggests that firms in lower tiers of supply 
chains simply cannot pay more; other literature suggests that skills cannot be leveraged without 
complementary investments in machinery and training.  It follows that these skills—and 
corresponding “middle skill,” “apprenticeable” trades—might be more valuable, but that smaller 
firms face barriers to compensating these skills. Their failure here may diminish the supply 
chain’s ability to regenerate these skills.   
Intermediate goods suppliers may be uniquely able to decipher these issues in the context 
of the automotive industry, as they are increasingly responsible for managing skilled labor 
internally and in their supply network. Ignoring the uneven relationship between skills, supply 
chain position, and wages, they may fail to recognize weak occupational links in their supply 
chains and overestimate the abilities of other firms to regenerate key skills.  Industry leaders, 
automakers, and Tier 1 suppliers might consider engaging smaller firms more strategically on 
this issue.   
One recommendation for future analysis of education and employment trends is to use 
multiple measures of skill, particularly when considering the production workforce or other 
populations that may have low variation in education levels but higher variation in other 
measures, such as experience or STEM-related skills (see Rothwell, 2013 and Stewart, 2017 
regarding the latter).  The long-held belief that skill accumulation leads to higher wages and 
regional growth has depended upon the use of education as a proxy for skill (for a critique, see 
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Hanushek et al., 2015 or Stewart, 2017).  But scholars have recognized that important workplace 
skills, like teamwork and communication, persistence, and trustworthiness, are not explicitly 
taught or measured in schools (Heckman & Rubinstein, 2001; Lerman, 2008; Murnane & Levy, 
1996).  Given the high level of debt students incur at college and variation in college completion 
rates, research and related policy prescriptions are becoming more detailed and targeted (see 
Carnevale, Cheah, & Hanson, 2015 for research on the returns to different college majors).  
The recommendation to use multiple measures of skill is also relevant to scholars of 
international development and economic growth as they examine the “skilled” labor component 
of domestic value added in traded goods and the “skill content” of different products.  
Alternative measures of skill, such as those utilized in this study and others available through 
O*NET OnLine, should be sought by domestic as well as international research teams.11    
Finally, a skills-in-supply-chains framework can serve as a tool for workforce 
development specialists seeking to identify where workers’ skills could be better developed, 
recognized, and rewarded.  In a local labor market context, it provides additional information to 
evaluate potential career pathways across companies in different sectors of the supply chain, 
helping practitioners structure further examination into occupational mobility issues, such as how 
labor flows between large and small firms.  It could also help practitioners compare local 
occupational assets and aspirations to the demands of both existing industry and potential new 
recruits, planning how to advance the skills of a local area.  All these efforts would strengthen 
U.S. manufacturing supply chains and help pinpoint local comparative advantage.  
                                                          
11 The various measures of skill utilized in this analysis—education, experience, O*NET job zones—could enhance 
scholars’ evaluation of the shifting skill requirements of various industries and occupations.  These details can 
advance research regarding how technology adoption effects skill requirements as well as where different types of 
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PAPER 2:  A SUPPLY CHAIN ANALYSIS OF SKILL 
COMPETITION AND CO-PRODUCTION  
Introduction 
Smaller firms are known to underinvest in training their employees. They also tend to pay 
lower wages than their larger counterparts, making it difficult to attract and retain top talent. 
Without the capacity to update skills on a regular basis or the ability to retain skilled workers, 
these firms face a double jeopardy: their small size limits their ability to train their own and to 
“buy” skilled labor, locking them into an unproductive corner of the labor market where they 
constitute a dead end for job seekers.  
Most research assumes that low levels of training and low wages are due to size-related 
internal restrictions—reduced resources, poor work organization, or inability to connect to 
workforce development systems. This paper broadens the lens to consider how top-down buyer-
supplier networks can influence whether firms, both large and small, invest in training.  
In a supply chain context, more powerful buyers can set cost and quality expectations for 
a subordinate supplier. Buyers can use formal contract terms or communicate cost and quality 
expectations less formally, such as through repeated interactions. These dynamics are 
consequential for economic regions, where inter-firm relationships and related training 
(dis)incentives can either bolster or undermine the health of local firms. Sometimes intersecting 
processes of divestment can proceed behind the scenes. If a supplier is expected to focus on cost 
reductions, it will become difficult to defend investments in human resources. And where buyers 
and suppliers are co-located, they may compete for skilled labor. This means that, in addition to 
setting contract terms that make it difficult to invest in workers’ skills, buyers may also 
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undermine co-located suppliers’ skill development efforts when they inadvertently recruit talent 
away from their suppliers. In this regard, the decision to invest in skill development is shaped by 
both a firm’s relative position in a supply chain and the degree of competition for skilled workers 
within that same network.   
This paper explores how supply chain dynamics affect the training decisions of firms, 
focusing on firms’ decisions to provide initial on-the-job training for skilled production 
technicians, including through apprenticeships. I observe a single concentrated buyer-supplier 
network in one automotive cluster, drawing insights from industry-level occupational data and 
27 interviews with economic and workforce development practitioners and company 
representatives—human resources directors, owners and branch plant managers. This case shows 
that the cost-reducing pressures of supply chain dynamics and lean production practices have 
constrained training resources across the private sector. For some firms, external supply chain 
pressures lead to divestment from training as well as a disconnect from traditional skill 
development systems. These industrial dynamics suggest that firms’ training decisions may be 
closely related to their position vis-à-vis clients and product markets, perhaps exacerbating size-
related constraints.  
I also find evidence that top-down corrections initiated by clients and bottom-up solutions 
led by smaller and lower-tier firms can counteract some of the training- and wage-suppressing 
trends that are driven by cost pressures.  Likewise, I find that firms that are not entirely captive to 
the automotive industry and its intensive cost constraints, but which have diversified their client 
base, have an opportunity to leverage that product market diversification: they can use the 
greater profit margins to invest in more aggressive and competitive training investments, offer 
higher wages, or both.  
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These solutions demonstrate that firms in the same labor market, facing similar cost and 
quality constraints, can offer a variety of viable training packages, and some distinguish 
themselves in this respect. Firms that are successful in providing training not only overcome 
supply-chain related constraints but do so by engaging local education and training institutions 
like the community college system. A few also engage other local firms. Surprising strategies 
emerge in this highly competitive but networked environment, including the engagement of 
younger workers in high school, training candidates that are less in demand by larger and higher-
tier suppliers, but which have the potential to benefit from training.  
The findings of this paper suggest opportunities for action by economic development 
practitioners. In the longer term, economic developers can help to build institutions that support 
supply chain capacity and ingenuity in addressing skill development bottlenecks. More 
immediately, there is room for extending public sector support for employee training along the 
supply chain, directing resources to clients and their co-located suppliers. This extension of 
services following large firm expansion events would help suppliers sharpen their skills when 
they are both poised for growth (having renewed or expanded contracts) and face reduced risk of 
losing new staff to their expanding client’s hiring efforts.   
Even more critically, efforts by economic developers to support skill development along 
an entire supply chain could capture the attention of suppliers who are willing to invest in 
training, helping to galvanize more creative supply-side engagement strategies and more 
meaningful coordination around issues of skill development. More generally, to support 
constrained firms in raising wages or investing in training or both, local leaders should aim to 
shift the focus from a discussion that has centered around the tradeoffs between training and 
wages to consider training and wages as potential complements. It is also important consider 
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more than just training and wages: firms can distinguish themselves based on their entire 
employment offer, job quality and fit with existing, new and returning labor market entrants. For 
some firms, offering and providing training is key to ensuring an enduring and productive fit 
with employees.  
In the next section, I discuss firm-led, on-the-job training trends, considering local- and 
supply chain-based dynamics. The third section describes the research setting, data and methods. 
In the following two sections, I interpret the results. The sixth section discusses findings. The last 
section concludes with policy implications.  
Background 
In 1964, Gary S. Becker published his influential treatise on human capital, modeling 
empirical puzzles and rationalizing training and education decisions. Regarding when firms train, 
he explained that firms invest in training only when the relevant skills are specific to the firm, 
and not when the skills are transferable to other firms or general in nature (Becker, 1964). In the 
latter case, workers bear the costs and reap the benefits of training. While the general/specific 
skill model is theoretically compelling, it relies on the strong assumption of a perfectly 
competitive labor market. 
In a perfectly competitive market, many firms compete for labor, workers are mobile 
across firms, firms have perfect information about each worker’s ability, and firms communicate 
demand with wages. If some firms decide to train, other firms will simply lure the training firm’s 
trained workers away with higher wages. (This is because all firms have the same technology 
and cost structure and hence the same budget for training and wages.) Training will rarely occur 
under these conditions, since no firm could retain the benefits of training (Becker, 1964; Pigou, 
1912). Without barriers to worker mobility, and with transparency in abilities and skills, each 
 
48 
firm also must pay closer to the full marginal product of the worker including increases in 
worker productivity due to training. It is therefore up to the worker to invest in training. 
In imperfect or less competitive labor markets, there are a number of conditions which 
motivate firms to pay for training and reap its benefits. In general, frictions in the labor market 
allow employers to pay less than the marginal product of labor, making it easier for them to 
recoup their investment and retain skilled labor (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999: F119-120). These 
frictions include barriers to information flows between firms (regarding workers’ skills and 
abilities), matching costs (recruitment and job search) and other limits to worker mobility. Firms 
will find that, in a less competitive market, it is a good investment to train, and that general skills 
can be “de-facto firm-specific skills” with limited labor market competition (Acemoglu & 
Pischke, 1999: F120). 
What are the possible training outcomes in imperfectly competitive labor markets? 
Becker proposed a no firm-sponsored training scenario, based on the idea that firms would not be 
able to both invest in training and raise wages above market rates, yet this is exactly what some 
firms are able to do given actual labor market imperfections. Related theoretical and empirical 
studies show that firms that train benefit from increased productivity without substantially 
increasing costs, because there is a compression of wages (Barron, Berger and Black, 1997; 
Dearden & Van Reenan, 2005; Konings & Vanormelingen, 2010). Productivity gains from 
training outpace wage increases as firms pay below the marginal product of labor. Some firms 
pay below the marginal product of labor but above market wage rates. Other firms, with limited 
competition for their skilled labor, can pay below both marginal product of labor and market 
rates. Their ability to do so may derive from their monopsony power (Becker, 1964; Acemoglu & 
Pischke, 1999). Monopsonists, as they are called, are the only buyer of a specific skill or one of a 
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few buyers and so they face low levels of labor market competition. They can lower wages if 
they prefer while still retaining skilled labor (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999: F119). 
Firms also share training costs with workers, such as through reduced wages during an 
apprenticeship. In such an arrangement, a worker’s wages are low during training, then rise 
steeply as the worker graduates to a master craftsman or another credential. The critical 
condition for these shared costs is credible contracts, which can support training even with near 
perfect labor market competition (Acemoglu & Pischke, 1998; Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999; 
Acemoglu & Autor, n.d.). 
Another important consideration in imperfect markets is the heterogeneity of firms. 
Scholars have suggested that firm size and firm strategy are important sources of heterogeneity 
among firms in the same labor market. Some firms may pursue positions of power over their 
workers, acting strategically to develop their monopsonistic position and decrease labor mobility. 
Likewise, other firms adopt High Performance Work Systems, a bundle of competitive human 
resources and work practices that compel employees to maximize their effort. Theoretically, 
these firms can afford investments in new machinery, relevant training, competitive wages and 
benefits because they distinguish themselves in their product markets for high quality products 
and services (Appelbaum, Bailey, Berg, and Kalleberg, 2000; Batt, 2002). Firms are more likely 
to pursue this latter strategy in high-wage, high-skill industries; for example, firms in the 
financial industry train more (Osterman, 1994; Osterman, 1995; Lynch, 1994). Examples of 
employers deploying this strategy in low-wage industries are rare (see Osterman, 2018 regarding 
“high road” employers).  
Firms with more resources are also more able to invest in training and complementary 
human resource policies. Larger firms, in general, tend to train more, and scholars explain that 
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larger firms have a variety of internal advantages and a number of available tactics that help 
them attract, train and retain skilled labor (Cappelli, 2009, 2012; Osterman, 2018). Smaller firms 
have deficits in these areas (Brown, Hamilton, Medoff, 1990; Osterman, 1994; Osterman & 
Weaver, 2014)12 and their low levels of training are often linked to size-related internal 
restrictions—limitations to adopting modern work organization or inability to engage 
productively and consistently with education and training institutions. Even within a similar 
labor market environment, smaller firms tend to invest less in training relative to their larger 
counterparts.  
A compounding factor may relate to supply chain dynamics, more specifically the 
position of smaller firms vis-à-vis their downstream clients. Firm size can be correlated with 
supply chain position, so these factors are sometimes difficult to distinguish. As discussed in the 
first dissertation chapter, a supply chain (or “value chain”) framework can help to identify actors 
with more (or less) resources and power. Scholars explain that automotive supply chain 
dynamics are different than textile supply chain dynamics (Gereffi & Korzeniewicz, 1994). In 
each supply chain, the distinct dispersal of power informs investment opportunities and 
constraints.  
The power dynamics in supply chain relationships often mean that larger companies end 
up with control over value-added activities as they outsource lower value-added activities and 
cost constraints to their suppliers. Suppliers, in turn, pass cost constraints to another lower tier of 
                                                          
12 In general, global competition and the outsourcing activities of multinational corporations seem to push cost 
reduction burdens to firms further down the supply chain. Small firms in lower tiers of the supply chain may be 
particularly constrained in their ability to provide quality jobs and job training. Smaller firms in the United States 
not only pay lower wages, but also invest less in training (Black & Lynch, 1996; Brown, Hamilton, & Medoff, 1990; 
Harrison, 1994; Lynch & Black, 1998; Osterman, 1995).  In 2014, Paul Osterman and Andrew Weaver found that 
skill shortages were overstated in general, but where they exist may be more acutely felt among smaller firms 
(Osterman & Weaver, 2014). 
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suppliers. The result is that firms in lower tiers of supply chains, often smaller firms, are facing 
formidable pressure to reduce costs, demands which are explicit in their contracts with clients. 
The global automotive industry is a prime example of a supply chain in which cost reduction 
expectations arise on an annual basis. The nature of cost-reducing contracts in turn can limit a 
firm’s ability to invest in new machinery and skilled labor (Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi, 201113; 
Helper et al., 2011; MacDuffie & Kochan, 1995; Theodore & Weber, 2001; Weber & Schnell, 
2003). Scholars have also suggested some specific ways that supplier-client dynamics between 
firms can limit training, such as when contracts emphasize cost over quality (Cappelli, 2012).  
Could these supplier-buyer dynamics affect training decisions equally or more so than 
firm size or labor market context? If so, how can they be resolved? This paper investigates these 
questions and shows that it is not size alone, but power dynamics within the supply chain, that 
affect firms’ training behavior. This additional level of variation in firm training behavior can 
help explain why some firms, both large and small, in high skill industries, end up 
underinvesting in training. Supply chain pressures can put lower tier firms in a lose-lose 
scenario, with cost constraints leading to low training and low wages, creating a form of double 
jeopardy for both the firm and its employees, perhaps the least optimal of all the training 
scenarios described above.    
Taken together, the previous literature motivates the following research questions: How 
do supply chain dynamics affect firm level decisions about training?  Under what conditions can 
suppliers overcome their supply chain constraints to provide work-based learning? What 
strategies do they devise that might lend themselves to further institutional or policy support? 
                                                          
13 Barrientos, Gereffi & Rossi (2011) describe a variety of labor impacts (voice/representation, safety, wages) from 
cost reduction pressures and quality expectations created by large, lead firms in their supply chains. They 




These questions are addressed through a study of automotive industry suppliers’ training 
behavior in the state of South Carolina. South Carolina has a booming automotive industry, with 
exports increasing through the Great Recession, and with enviable levels of public-private 
collaboration in meeting labor demand. The South Carolina Chamber of Commerce is regularly 
credited for its convening power around workforce development issues. Prominent industry 
groups such as the South Carolina Automotive Council and powerful multi-national automotive 
firms have all been involved in establishing South Carolina’s much-lauded state apprenticeship 
program. Apprenticeship Carolina, as it is called, is run by the state’s technical or community 
college system, which, with its 16 campuses, has long been a key asset of the state in its 
industrial recruitment and development efforts. Larger automotive firms and their most 
prominent suppliers headline the state’s high commitment training programs, while other 
automotive firms are involved to different degrees.  
The density of the automotive cluster in the northwest corner of South Carolina allowed 
me to observe small- and medium-sized suppliers in the same labor market, but in different 
supply chain positions. In seeking to understand their skill demands and skill development 
decisions, I paid particular attention to whether, when and why firms support multi-year on-the-
job training programs and apprenticeships in-house. This paper focuses on the training of skilled 
tradesmen rather than production workers more generally because training and preparation for 
the skilled trades requires a multi-year commitment. The decision whether or not to train is a 
highly consequential one for the companies that rely on these skills.  
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In automotive parts production, Tier 2 supply sectors employ the highest percentage of 
skilled trades.14, 15 These sectors include the production of plastic parts, metal parts, metal 
processing, machinery and tools, and electronic parts. Thirty-seven percent of production 
workers in Tier 2 require the highest level of production skill development and preparation—
compared to 28 percent in Tier 1 and only eight percent at Automakers.16 
Table 11. Percent of Production Workers Requiring the 
Highest Level of Preparation by Supply Tier 
Percent Production Positions Requiring the 
Highest Level of Production Preparation 
Automakers* 8% 
Tier 1 Supply Sectors 28% 
Tier 2 Supply Sectors 37% 
Source: Author’s analysis of BEA I-O Tables 2007, BLS OES Industry-
Occupation Matrices for South Carolina 2016, O*NET Online 2016 
*These are national results. Data is suppressed in this category for South 
Carolina due to the low number of firms in this category. 
 
The high level of preparation required by Tier 2 firms reflects their high percentage of 
skilled tradesmen—particularly machinists, machine maintenance, and machine programming 
                                                          
14 Data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis National Input-Output Tables were used to establish the 
intensity and direction of economic transactions between related industry sectors at the national level, and these are 
further confirmed by sub-sector research at the state level. 
15 Data on occupations are drawn from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Occupational Employment Statistics 
Industry-Occupation Matrices for South Carolina or “staffing patterns”; occupational skill requirements are 
collected from O*NET Online. O*NET Online provides a Job Zone categorization, which is a measure of education, 
experience and other preparation needed for an occupation. Job Zone 3 is the highest level of preparation needed for 
production occupations. Methods for analyzing occupational skill requirements by automotive supply chain tier have 
been previously outlined in detail (Forbes 2018, dissertation paper 1). 
16 Tier 1 firms supply automotive parts and systems to branded Automakers (e.g., Mercedes, VW, Ford). Automotive 
suppliers in these industries include large and medium-sized multi-national companies. Their location and 
equipment decisions are tied closely to Automaker demand. Tier 2 suppliers have clients in Tier 1. Some of these 
firms are completely dedicated to automotive production. Others also have clients outside of the automotive 
industry. As a whole, they are more diversified than Tier 1, and less directly connected to Automakers. 
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occupations.  For small machine shops, these types of positions could constitute 100 percent of 
production employment. Many of these skilled trades require several years of on-the-job training, 
usually in formal or informal apprenticeship of two to three years. 
In Table 12, I show the distribution of related production occupations across supply chain 
tiers, with higher skill occupations, each requiring at least two years of related experience, 
marked with an asterisk. These include machine maintenance, computer-controlled machine 
operators, machinists, and tool and die makers.  
Table 12. Variation in Production Occupations by Tier: 
Automaker, Tier 1, industries from Tier 2 
Occupational Groups Automakers^ 
Tier 1  
Supply 
Sectors 










Assemblers, Supervisors 83% 53% 19% 22% 
Machine Maintenance* 4% 8% 9% 11% 
Computer-Controlled Machine Tool Op* 0% 10% 3% 0% 
Machine Setters and Operators 7% 4% 26% 38% 
Machinists* 0% 10% 24% 6% 
Tool and Die Makers* 1% 2% 0% 0% 
Welders, Cutters, Solderers, and Brazers 0% 1% 6% 4% 
Inspectors, Testers, Sorters… 3% 5% 8% 12% 
Other 2% 7% 6% 8% 
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Source: Author’s analysis of BLS OES industry-occupation matrix for South Carolina, 2016 
*Higher skill occupations, requiring more than two years of related experience 
^These are national results. Data is suppressed in this category for South Carolina due to the low number of 
firms in this category. 
 
Interviewees were selected from firms in Tier 2 automotive supply sectors—firms 
producing plastic and metal parts, machinery, tools and electronics. I conducted two rounds of 
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semi-structured interviews in South Carolina’s Upstate region. I first interviewed 12 local 
economic and workforce development staff in May 2016 and then interviewed key decision-
makers at more than a dozen automotive suppliers in July 2017. At suppliers, I contacted Human 
Resource Directors and Plant Managers at the establishment level, based on recommendations by 
county economic development staff. In selecting firms, I also included a group of smaller 
suppliers that had participated in the state’s registered apprenticeship program. I initially 
contacted 30 automotive supplier companies with interview requests.  Of these, 14 granted 
interviews, four of which included site visits and plant tours.  
Table 13 describes the companies that were interviewed by manufacturing focus and 
Table 14 describes their employment range, the percent of firm interviewees that were local 
versus multi-national, and the percent that were dedicated to automotive production (i.e., 100 
percent of clients were in the automotive industry) versus diversified across automotive and 
aerospace or other industries. 
Table 13. Count of Company-based Interviewees by Manufacturing Industry 
Industry Count 
Electronics 1 






Companies were distributed among plastic, metal, machinery, machine shop and 
electronics suppliers to the automotive industry. Their level of employment ranged from three to 
450 employees. Just under one-third were local firms (vs multi-national) and just under one-third 




Table 14.  Interviewee Company Summary Information  
Employment 
Range 
Percent local  
(vs multi-national) 
Percent dedicated to automotive  
(vs diversified) 
3 to 450 29% 29% 
 
Each interview lasted between 45 minutes and two hours. For each firm interview, I 
created a summary of firm statistics and major themes. Interviews covered general, operational 
and relational themes. Relational themes were further grouped into cluster-based (peer firm or 
horizontal inter-firm relations) versus hierarchical supply-chain relations.   
The comparison of occupational demand across these supply chain sectors in Table 12 
points to potential labor market competition as well as to potential areas of collaboration in 
training, where key occupations require multiple years of training and are in demand by multiple 
industries. The skill demand overlap demonstrated by the public data presented in Table 12 was 
apparent in the interview data. For example, machinist is a higher skill occupation with a higher 
percentage of workers in Tier 1 and the Tier 2 high skill sectors. However, coordination in 
training was not apparent. Presumably both Tier 1 and Tier 2 firms are investing in training these 
workers and providing them with the experience they need to develop key skills. The degree of 
coordination with training providers and other firms was addressed in the interviews with Tier 2 
firms. I observed intense labor market competition and a variety of different training scenarios. 
Results 
Uneven Contributions to Buying and Making Skill 
For suppliers and economic development practitioners in South Carolina, the regional 
narrative begins with a branded Automaker’s decision to establish a branch plant in the region in 
the early 1990s. Interviewees explain how the Automaker reinvigorated the region’s 
manufacturing sector following the decline of textile manufacturing, and also paved the way for 
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the state’s expansion into aerospace. The Automaker chose this location in South Carolina 
because of the region’s strong manufacturing tradition and displaced manufacturing workforce.  
Interviewees also speak highly of South Carolina’s technical college system, a key 
partner in supporting the industrial transition through engagement with the Automaker and a 
select group of suppliers. The general ethos is that this region is lucky to have this Automaker to 
anchor regional manufacturing.  Even those that acknowledge significant challenges to supplying 
the automotive industry note that it is important to retain the business of the Automaker. 
Interviewees report that a major challenge for suppliers is attracting and retaining skilled 
production technicians. Suppliers report difficulty finding skilled machinists, machine 
maintenance technicians and machine programmers. The growth and increasing density of the 
automotive industry in South Carolina is a factor—in other words industry growth may be 
outpacing the supply of labor. New companies moving into the region are automated, lean 
companies requiring large teams of machine maintenance technicians.  
All interviewees experienced supply-chain-based cost constraints and cost-reducing 
incentives that limited their ability to train and retain trained workers. Suppliers dedicated to 
automotive clients reported the most constraint in their ability to train and raise wages. Some 
describe that sustained cost reductions have limited their capacity for training in-house—they 
were lean and had difficulty freeing up the time of their experienced staff to train new recruits. 
They also aimed to keep wages low to satisfy the expectations of their clients and multi-national 
headquarters.  
I categorized firms into three groups based on whether they provided in-house training 
for production technicians and their supply chain position: low train firms that are dedicated to 
automotive production, medium train firms that are diversified, and high train firms that are 
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diversified. Table 15 summarizes results from the firm-level interviews, which were completed 
with firms that had some interest in training, as recommended by local economic development 
practitioners. Table 16 presents an initial categorization of suppliers into three categories with 
low, medium and high levels of training.  



























57% 29% 14% 29% 29% 43% 
  
The interview content is further explored in four sections below. Interview analysis 
demonstrated that overlapping demand and supply chain pressure can lead to not only labor 
market competition but also to uneven contributions to training in support of regional skill 
replenishment. 
Table 16. Interviewee Distribution Across Three Categories 
Low Train and 
Dedicated 
Medium Train and 
Diversified 
High Train and 
Diversified 
29% 43% 29% 
 
Seeking to buy machinery maintenance technicians 
With many multi-national companies closely co-located in the region, demands on the 
community college system are high. When the Automaker arrived in the region, the community 
college system provided screening and short-term training of workers, and these programs are 
still some of the first tools that new arrivals use to identify and initiate their first round of hires. 
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As such, it is not surprising that many of the multi-national suppliers that were interviewed 
prefer to continue to source labor from the community college system, even though competition 
for these graduates is intense. Mid-sized, diversified multi-national companies report that they 
need more skilled production technicians to operate and maintain machinery but are less inclined 
than the Automaker and the largest suppliers to participate consistently in community college 
training programs that require on-the-job training commitments, like Apprenticeship Carolina.  
Some actors in the region assume market signals will eventually facilitate these firms’ 
increased in-house investments in training, but the combined interviews suggested a longer-term 
decline in the provision of on-the-job training. Practitioners suggested that companies would 
increase wages and their training commitments as they feel the pinch of a more limited supply 
(Interview 8) or when it becomes too painful (expensive or harmful to the company) to avoid 
these investments. Sometime soon companies will start investing in their workers and “growing 
their own” (Interview 2).  
Yet, companies were already operating under constraint at the time of the interviews—
constrained by their supply chain position and lean shop floor staffing. It takes several years to 
train production technicians, so the expected just-in-time signals that tell companies to start 
investing in training in-house will likely be delayed at least a few years. And labor market theory 
refutes the expectation that a more competitive market will induce training; the theory suggests 
that a more competitive labor market will lead to less training. In fact, there were already 
indicators that the market is very competitive. Multiple automotive suppliers admitted to luring 
experienced workers away from other automotive suppliers. One mid-sized company reported: 
“We’re all buying from the same employees.” Employees are lured from one place to another 
with small increases in hourly wages (Interview 10). An economic development practitioner 
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explained: “They’re going next door and paying $1 more an hour and trading people back and 
forth” (Interview 2). Scholars warn that this pattern can become a vicious cycle, reducing 
everyone’s ability to train and retain workers (Becker, 1964; Cappelli, 1998).  
Most firms had sponsored apprentices and had experienced the disappointment of losing 
their investment when a trainee leaves soon after the end of a multi-year training period. All of 
these companies hope to avoid a repeat experience, but only a few reported having implemented 
contractual agreements requiring a period of tenure after training.  
For some mid-sized multi-national companies, their skill demands matched with the skill 
supply from local community college programs. Their match with this labor source was helping 
them to compete in their product markets while offering less on-the-job training. Competition for 
community college graduates was high, but some companies were able to compete for these 
graduates, paying mid-level wages, but also making connections through career counselors and 
course instructors, and offering co-ops and internships (rather than the more time and resource 
intensive apprenticeships). Meanwhile, other mid-sized multi-national companies struggled to 
compete for these talented graduates or graduates were not a good fit. Some were in lower wage 
sectors, some were captive to automotive clients and had little room the maneuver vis-à-vis the 
education system, some needed different skill sets. Some new transplants to the region had not 
yet established strong relationships with educational institutions, were paying below market 
wages, and were reliant on their clients to initiate and make room for improvements. 
Making machinery maintenance technicians in-house 
The previous section described the preferences of mid-sized multi-national firms to “pay 
for” or “buy” trained production technicians rather than train them in-house. Most of the firms 
that are entirely dependent on an automotive client fit in this category. Meanwhile, other multi-
national companies and local companies in the area have a more diverse client pool, serve 
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multiple manufacturing industries outside of automotive production, and tend to do more 
training. Some provide small parts in high volume, others provide more varied parts and 
services, fix molds for casting metal and plastic parts, create and fix other metalworking tools. 
The high-volume parts companies receive five to 30 percent of their business from automotive-
related clients. Small metal parts and services companies are either direct suppliers to 
Automakers or to first tier suppliers of Automakers—with the exception of one toolmaker that 
had transitioned almost entirely from automotive to aerospace contracts, they receive about half 
of their business from Automakers and large automotive suppliers. 
In seeking skilled production employees, these more diversified companies do train in-
house, though not necessarily in coordination with the community college system and sometimes 
in more informal settings. The firms with high levels of in-house training—mostly small metal 
parts and services companies, but also including one larger company—value experience and 
loyalty above all else. With the majority of these companies unable (in their own words) to pay 
the highest wages or provide robust internal career pathways, they emphasize that employees 
learn valuable skills on the job. They specifically seek employees that are a “good fit” for their 
company—for example, employees that will enjoy working at a smaller or more familial 
company—in hopes that they will be more likely to stay with the company over time.  
However, these medium- and high-level training companies report losing even their most 
meticulously chosen trainees to their largest clients or to other multi-national companies in the 
area. In fact, almost all the companies I interviewed had a story of losing employees to a large 
Tier 1 company that had recently expanded its 2,000-employee plant in the region. Experienced 
production technicians are in high demand by all companies and these technicians can constitute 
as much as 60 percent of positions in a small, high-skill firm.  
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Experiencing the challenges of limited labor market supply, high training companies have 
engaged local leaders, school administrators and young people in local high schools, encouraging 
students to consider manufacturing careers. To attract young people to manufacturing, these 
companies must contend with the impression that manufacturing is a dead-end career, or dirty 
and dangerous work, as it was historically in the local textiles plants. Smaller firms are more 
explicit about these challenges as well as supply-side constraints, suggesting that their pain is 
more acute compared to their larger counterparts.  
High training companies, which are training in-house, also face additional challenges in 
adjusting to emerging trends in manufacturing training and education. The state’s model of 
community college training has been growing in popularity since 2008. With low 
unemployment, job seekers can name their contract terms, and many expect employers to 
provide financial support for continuing education; young people seeking employment in 
manufacturing are now also seeking a community college degree, with employer-provided 
tuition. But larger multi-nationals are likely to recruit such newly credentialed workers directly 
from the community college system, away from other employers. Any experienced, credentialed 
worker emerging from an apprenticeship program or community college program will likely be 
lured away by another company. As one multi-national company explained, “Folks who go to 
school to be technicians get snatched up pretty quickly” (Interview 19). 
Companies doing high levels of training in-house find themselves in a tough spot. Not 
only is it difficult for these companies to match the wages of the larger multi-national companies 
in the area and pay for the community college tuition that is increasingly in demand, but they 
also feel supply-side constraint more acutely, and do not all feel that the college system is 
serving them well. Smaller companies in lower tiers of the supply chain that do invest in the 
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community college curriculum, allowing employees flexible hours to attend classes, paying for 
books and tuition, are more likely to lose their trainees. And some smaller companies simply do 
not see the value in coursework anyway; work experience is more valuable to them.  
While some companies have reimbursement contracts that require trainees to stay a 
certain period after training (or repay the company-provided college tuition), smaller firms are 
timid to ask for these contract terms. One company had only one candidate seeking employment 
with them, and they hoped to make a strong personal connection with that individual, not to 
pressure her with contract terms.  
While smaller companies consider raising wages and offering tuition benefits, they report 
that they are limited in their ability to attract job seekers and to effectively reward workforce 
skill and skill development. The next two sections of this paper introduce the effects of external 
cost constraints on firms in the automotive industry. I first address the experiences and responses 
of automotive suppliers in general and then those that are dedicated to automotive clients.  
Operating under cost constraint 
A larger, more powerful client can set cost and quality expectations for a subordinate 
supplier through a formal contract or more informally through interactions. While there is a risk 
that a cost focus can limit investments in training and human resources and reduce the quality of 
a supplier’s work, these tradeoffs are often hidden from view. In this analysis, cost expectations 
by Automakers are explicit. Suppliers have varying abilities to contest the cost expectations and 
to highlight how they undermine product quality and reliable product delivery. 
Local economic development practitioners explained that the cost pressures of the 
automotive industry put suppliers in the difficult position of balancing cost constraints with their 
need for skilled labor, particularly as they compete with multi-nationals moving into the area. 
The Automaker “has the ability to keep the suppliers under their thumb, so to speak, and then the 
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suppliers are relegated to second position on what they can pay labor,” meaning that the 
suppliers cannot pay as much as the Automaker, or as much as Tier 1 suppliers (Interview 3).  
Companies who want to distinguish themselves as a good employer by paying higher 
wages are constrained from doing just that. Automakers are not unlike Wal-Mart, another 
practitioner explained, comparing Automakers to the powerful retail buyer able to reduce costs to 
barely sustainable levels based on its huge buying power and knowledge of cost limits. The 
Automakers, he explained, “are pretty good at figuring out that the line is as low as it could 
possibly go” (Interview 2).  
For suppliers at lower levels of the supply chain, cost pressures are hard to avoid. 
Automakers place restrictions on the rate per hour that suppliers can charge, a seemingly non-
negotiable contract feature. This directly restricts the wages that suppliers can extract from the 
rate per hour. These cost-reducing pressures not only come from Automakers but also from Tier 
1 suppliers that manage upstream supplier networks. In this regard, the cost pressures facing Tier 
1 suppliers are often passed down through the supply chain (Interview 2). 
For those suppliers that are diversified among clients and industries, the automotive 
industry is the most demanding. One supplier explained, “This is not our usual way of doing 
business, but we do it,” making accommodations for automotive industry contracts (Interview 
A7). Another supplier explained that he leverages other contracts to pay his workers more than 
automotive contracts allow (Interview A2).  
One smaller metal tools supplier had a different reaction to the cost pressures: he decided 
to exit the automotive industry altogether. It was a risk, he says, moving away from high volume 
automotive contracts, but the volume was so high that the price was “a big deal, in some cases 
over everything” (Interview 21).  He pursued an opportunity to transition toward aerospace 
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clients and contracts and says that his exit from automotive allowed a renewed focus on value-
driven production and product innovation. “Our tools have a greater value,” he reports, pointing 
out that the tools his company makes facilitate process improvements for his clients (Interview 
21). His company now has more room for innovation. 
Diversified companies that choose to continue participation in the automotive industry 
have to pay lower wages and find other ways to increase staff retention or raise wages and accept 
losses on automotive contracts. Most choose the latter, balancing losses on automotive contracts 
with work from other clients. This balancing act would seem to make it very hard to raise wages 
and develop and grow the business. The likely loss, as Interviewee 21 pointed out above, is in 
innovation and product improvement, if not in quality. 
Captive and operating under cost constraint 
Mid-sized multi-national companies not only experience the cost constraints of their 
automotive clients but are also constrained by the expectations of their headquarters, both 
expecting the branch plants to keep costs low. Dedicated automotive suppliers seem to 
experience the most sustained pressure to reduce costs. There are, however, a few opportunities 
to negotiate cost increases.  
Automakers regularly audit their suppliers. While audits give clients insight into potential 
cost reductions, they also allow clients to identify process and even human resource issues that 
might affect product quality. When human resource issues became particularly egregious, clients 
may be convinced to support human resource investments. For example, high turnover among 
production workers requires constant training and initiation periods and can slow production. If 
workers are leaving for higher wages elsewhere, the company might consider raising wages. An 
Automaker can help a direct supplier identify and respond to this issue by signaling their support 
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for or, or by outright demanding, changes. A direct (Tier 1) supplier may also extend the same 
vigilance to its own supply chain. 
In one case, a multi-national Tier 2 supplier had been struggling with high turnover rates 
but could not get support from their headquarters to raise wages. An audit by a Tier 1 client 
pointed to the effect of turnover on product quality. In response, the Automaker required the 
supplier to address the issue. This provided the supplier with enough leverage to negotiate with 
their headquarters for wage increases. The audit and client concern were the evidence needed for 
a compelling argument, and wage increases were approved.   
Tier 1 suppliers are in a unique position to help Automakers connect the dots between 
production bottlenecks and supply-chain related human resource issues. They pass costs down 
from Automakers through to their own suppliers, but this also gives them a vantage point from 
which to recognize and focus the Automaker’s attention on issues caused by cost constraints. 
Some Tier 1 suppliers have used their close relationships with Automakers to draw attention to 
the problems that cost pressure can create for Tier 2 suppliers—not simply by constraining 
wages, but also by undermining competing demands for product quality. In one case, the 
involvement of Automaker and a Tier 1 supplier helped galvanize major improvements to 
internal work organization at a Tier 2 supplier; the multiple parties negotiated solutions that were 
manageable for all parties.  
These mechanisms for negotiation between buyer and supplier may become increasingly 
necessary as some automotive industry suppliers have been in cost-reduction mode for decades 
and there is not much more efficiency to be gained. It is difficult for some companies to find 
additional costs to cut. Regarding the option of raising wages to attract talent, one interviewee 
asked: “Where are you going to get a little bit more margin? What more can you do? … There 
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are definitely tighter and tighter requirements of the supply base” (Interview 5). His response 
suggested not only that it is difficult to raise wages, but that the only option might be to squeeze 
further cost reductions from lower tier suppliers. 
Some mid-sized suppliers have reduced all possible waste—including training capacity. 
Even if mid-sized multi-national companies wanted to train highly skilled production technicians 
in-house, they might not be able. Several company representatives explained that their 
companies are too lean and automated. While their machinery requires attention and 
maintenance by skilled professionals, the leanness of the plant means that they cannot spare the 
time of a skilled professional to train others (Interviews A1, 16, 18). With other companies, it 
was apparent from their staffing structure that they lacked both high skill capacity and the middle 
rungs of the training ladder that otherwise could facilitate the internal advancement of production 
workers, who could learn new skills incrementally while on the job. Instead, only basic 
production operators and a few high skill technicians were employed. 
A limitation is that these trends and the ability of Tier 1 suppliers to address them is that 
Tier 1 suppliers can only address what they see. While audits are commonplace, identifying the 
connection between quality issues and human resources issues is not. Luckily, their mediation is 
not the only option for advancing skills and wages along the supply chain. 
Smaller companies make a move—bottom up solutions 
Smaller firms are devising innovative strategies to retain and reinvest in their skilled 
workforce. An especially innovative approach involves a group of smaller suppliers that have 
banded together to improve recruitment and retention efforts, working across manufacturing 
industry lines to include firms that have multiple supply chain affiliations.  
In the 1990s, a national association of metalworking organized a local group of 
metalworking companies in Greenville, South Carolina, in a new training initiative. The local 
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cluster was, at the time, transitioning from textiles to automotive production and local companies 
needed new skills. The local companies each registered apprenticeship programs and began 
training new staff under the apprenticeship model. But the national association’s leadership left 
the local consortium with little local organization. While one company emerged as a champion 
of apprenticeship, each company toiled separately without the benefit of learning from the 
others’ challenges. The businesses struggled, not only with the training challenge, but also in 
their various markets; at least half of the shops were closed by 2016. Those that continued were 
discouraged by the reduced power of the consortium, the increasing challenges of serving the 
automotive sector, and their inability to retain trained employees. 
In their wake, another promising constellation of manufacturing firms has emerged, and 
this group has several sustaining features. Like the previous group, there are one or two firms 
that are very active, engaged and leading work across the education and industry sectors. One of 
these is an automotive supplier. But, unlike the previous group, a local business association, 
representing companies from different industries, and not a national single industry entity, 
supports group members. This new group is also closely aligned around supporting and growing 
a local technical high school. Group members have institutional roles vis-à-vis the county 
industry association, the county’s manufacturing association, and the technical high school.  
They serve on the boards and have formed an unofficial advisory group to the high school. The 
industry association addresses both economic and education issues and the goals of the 
manufacturing association are educational, social and economic, in that order.  
With aggregated demand and institutional engagement, these firms are more visible in the 
local labor market and positioned centrally in the flow of labor from area high schools to area 
employers and community colleges. They recruit young scholars and technicians to the local 
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vocational high school and to work at their companies, even staying engaged in years when they 
are not personally hiring. Year after year, with their help, the vocational high school has 
increased its applications and enrollment. Their central position in the local skill development 
system that helps them keep an eye on each other, boosting accountability while also increasing 
their mutual understanding and trust. Firms here can win by training, not by poaching. 
This new group has a track record of success. First, group members refer talented trainees 
and employees to each other when employees are looking to optimize their fit in the local cluster. 
They seek to find the best fit for trainees and employees within the local area, not necessarily 
within the boundaries of their plant. Second, group members refer business to each other when 
customers are looking for a specific niche service or product. This then encourages the 
companies to specialize and further develop their niche business offerings. Activities that bring 
the companies together, such as their local organizational affiliations, allow them to pinpoint 
their niche employment offer. 
Poaching by larger companies is still an issue, but instead of retreating from training, the 
smaller firms are doubling down on their unique ability to train workers. Instead of seeing larger 
companies as threats, the smaller companies seek their participation. One of these smaller firms 
explained that “big companies write the check and we get our hands dirty” (Interview 8), 
indicating that the larger companies will make financial contributions to the local vocational 
school and will provide the equipment for training. The owners and managers of the smaller 
companies are more likely to be on site, in the classroom, giving lectures and coaching students 
on how to use the equipment. 
The way these smaller companies position themselves also helps assuage some of the 
tensions introduced by the increased drive toward community college education in 
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manufacturing, and the increasing expectation that employers pay for workers’ education and 
credentialing. Working with the high school allows local firms to meet students that are college 
bound and seeking these benefits, but also to reach students who may be a better long-term fit for 
their small shops, who are passionate about the industry, working with their hands, and looking 
for a vocational path to work. One of the firms in this group accommodates both of these 
pathways and individualizes trainees’ development plans, a practice that could be more difficult 
for a larger firm, depending on the flexibility of their human resources staff. 
Discussion 
Analyzing firms’ training decisions in the context of their supply chains shows how 
supply chain position and firm size inform skill demand. With varying ability to train, to reduce 
costs and to contest cost reductions, overlapping demand for production technicians can lead to 
uneven contributions to training in support of skill replenishment. The trend among mid-sized 
multi-nationals is away from multi-year commitments to training production technicians in-
house (e.g., apprenticeships) and toward increased reliance on the community college system. 
Firms providing a high level of on-the-job training have a hard time making a match with the 
community college and enabling workers to gain an industry-recognized credential while also 
protecting their training investment. 
Where firms advance strategic and targeted investments in training and skill 
development, they seem to reduce their exposure to zero sum labor market competition. Where 
multiple high skill firms offered unique training packages in coordination with each other, they 
seemed to increase the provision of training across firms. In one example, firms worked together 
to cast a wide net for training candidates, offering their various training and employment 
pathways as a menu from which potential employees could pick and choose, helping to improve 
the final employer-employee matches and support investments in training. 
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Some firms, however, fail to leverage their ability to train into business development. 
Others, without in-house training capacity, and captive to automotive clients, struggle to keep 
their wages at a competitive level. Some of these firms seemed on the verge of withdrawing from 
the skilled labor market, focusing business strategy in another direction, turning to further 
automation, shrinking or closing shop. Firm size did not seem to define these trajectories—firm 
exposure to supply-chain-based cost constraints and hierarchies were more strongly correlated. 
For dedicated automotive suppliers, interventions by their clients helped firms increase wages, 
address limits to training, re-invest in workers and remain in the supply chain. 
In many of the examples of successful training, firms recognized their supply-chain 
related constraints and sought support for various targeted recruitment and training strategies. 
Some engaged with clients to identify workable solutions, and their results ranged from wage 
increases to organizational restructuring. Firms that activated supply chain and other inter-firm 
relationships to increase training investments also adopted multi-pronged training strategies to 
take advantage of local education and training institutions to engage local labor pools. These 
strategies were sometimes surprising. For example, firms that had the capacity to train did not 
necessarily seek to attract the most in-demand talent, but rather they attempted to make a 
productive match with undeveloped talent. This allowed them to keep wages low while still 
providing a competitive offer to trainees and future employees.  
Importantly, in spite of the annoyance of poaching by firms offering higher wages, the 
decision to train appears disconnected from wage setting practices. For firms competing for 
skilled production technicians in very competitive labor markets, wages were set in response to 
area wage surveys, not necessarily in response to poaching experiences, and never as a proactive 
high-wage strategy in coordination with training. All firms reported they aimed to set their wages 
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at mid-level, about average for the area. Training, on the other hand, was provided strategically 
and cautiously, where firm capacity provided the opportunity to train, and was not limited by 
lean manufacturing practices or by automotive contracts.  
While cost constraints reportedly limited the firms to paying wages below their preferred 
wage rates, wages were less determinate of firms’ ability to make successful training investments 
than other factors. Rather, cost constraints loomed large: firms reported that the cost cutting 
processes they have endured for decades (and exhausted) help to explain a reduced tendency to 
support shop-floor training.  The limited use of training contracts also caused these companies 
difficulty and forced them to manage risks that could have otherwise been resolved.   
The heterogeneity of firms is important, particularly where variation by supply chain 
position (diversified or dedicated to automotive) informs not only the decision to train in house 
but also broader regional labor market dynamics. There was evidence of competition across 
firms of larger and smaller size, higher and lower supply chain position, with higher and lower 
levels of in-house training, etc. These differences informed the flow of labor from, for example, 
supplier to client (from lower to higher wages, and from lower to higher tier suppliers), which 
tends to pull talent away from training companies. This problematic spillover of skilled labor 
from supplier to client or from smaller to larger firms may be counterintuitive to researchers 
accustomed to seeking evidence of spillover from larger to smaller firms. While smaller firms 
may intercept or slow the flow of labor to larger firms, it is unlikely they will be able to reverse 
the flow.  
Also, some firms are in a more direct relationship with their automotive clients. Supplier 
audits and higher levels of communication among larger firms allow companies to identify 
problems related to cost constraints. Tier 1 suppliers play a mediating role with lower tier 
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suppliers: they pass cost restrictions down to their suppliers and highlight related issues of 
constraint to their clients, sometimes connecting production quality and process issues to deficits 
in human resources. Their ability to address bottlenecks in the talent pipeline is limited by how 
far down the supply chain they can see and whether they would recognize if a human resource 
issue was causing a problem. These efforts might not reach the smallest firms, lowest tier 
suppliers, and diversified members of the supply chain if Tier 1 suppliers do not see them as their 
responsibility, or do not see them at all.  
Some high skill intensity firms may feel forced to close up shop entirely while others 
double down on the unique training experience they can provide. Some firms have responded to 
cost and quality expectations by pooling resources, recognizing a shared vulnerability to real and 
persistent labor market challenges.  
Policy Implications 
Building on research regarding the influence of inter-firm networks for growth and 
innovation strategies, this paper examines how inter-firm networks affect decisions related to 
workforce skill and training.  This paper also adds to research on co-location or “clustering” 
dynamics by considering how skill development decisions of individual establishments within a 
localized supply chain are linked together. 
The costs of doing business in the lower tiers of the automotive supply chain are 
apparent. In spite of these challenges, there are a number of solutions that firms described 
deploying to support their investment in training. More innovative strategies include tempering 
constraint through client diversification, gaining access to advocates higher up the supply chain, 
and working together through collective action to come up with intra-supplier solutions. These 




This analysis challenges the assumption that we must always turn to larger firms for labor 
market solutions. Rather, smaller firms have the capacity to introduce solutions to address 
reported “skill gaps.” These small firms can offer collaboration as a real solution, grounded in 
their acute understanding of and intimate experience with labor shortages and the consequences 
of low-level commitments to training. The only way for companies to escape the skill gap is 
through the recognition that they depend on their clients, suppliers and competitors, large and 
small, for information, coordination and, ideally, collaboration and co-investment in the skill 
development system.   
That said, Tier 1 suppliers play a critical role. To keep larger firms from cannibalizing 
their own supply chain or undermining local skill development efforts, interventions might need 
to be explicitly tied to specific supply chains, so that clients are more aware of their suppliers’ 
interdependence. Tier 1 suppliers and mid-sized multi-national firms with diversified clients and 
community ties are in a good position to convene these conversations. Supply chain mapping 
efforts could link the bottom of the supply chain to the top, demonstrating the limited reach of 
current supplier development and audit programs, and drawing attention to initiatives that 
support lower tier companies. Unable to quantify their interdependence on local labor pools, co-
located firms will likely continue to poach each other’s labor without regard to the negative 
impact on training investments and, in the longer term, replenishment of skilled labor pools.  
Organizing and advocacy campaigns have been successful in engaging large clients and 
convincing them to ease restrictions on their suppliers, where greater compensation for products 
can be directly translated into higher wages or training. These seem to work best on a local level 




Two local program interventions could help smaller firms and lower tier suppliers take 
advantage of both cluster and supply chain dynamics. The first is the alignment of public sector 
training funds with supply chain development programs. State and local training funds are often 
awarded to large firms when they arrive or expand at an establishment site. But this is often done 
without regard to the parallel expansions required in their supply chains, including among co-
located suppliers (and potential suppliers).  
Given that larger firms with generally higher wages seem to easily attract labor from 
smaller firms and from their own suppliers, it makes sense to invest in suppliers and smaller 
firms, particularly high skill/high training firms, which may be the net producers of skilled labor. 
When the largest Tier 1 companies locate or expand in an area, with skill requirements similar to 
local companies and lower tier suppliers, they attract skilled labor away with higher wages. Just 
as training funds are provided to these largest of suppliers upon establishment or expansion in an 
area, plans should also be implemented to help local companies regenerate the labor they will 
likely lose to the larger firm. 
The second recommendation is for lower tier suppliers and local companies, particularly 
high skill/high training firms, to be provided the resources to rebuild their local vocational 
training programs. Local companies can collaborate with local high schools not only to expose 
students to manufacturing career opportunities, but also to facilitate the build out of hands-on 
learning programs, which can motivate students to complete high school. This will help them 
differentiate their offering and position themselves for further growth. 
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Efforts to integrate training with other services for smaller firms are underway.17 
Economic and workforce development strategists can further sharpen their training interventions 
when they consider participating firms’ supply chain position and size. Each industry has a 
unique pattern, but industries generally leave lower tier firms and their workers in the most 
vulnerable and least mobile positions. Greater attention should be paid to how and when 
recognition of a skill gap can lead to recognition of skill interdependence and a coordinated 
response. 
Existing place-based solutions for “skill gaps” tend to embrace the individualism rather 
than interdependence of employers, defaulting to the public sector for coordination activities. By 
relying on the public sector and its well-established selection of training and education solutions, 
economic development strategists risk ignoring potential roadblocks and synergies related to 
inter-firm relationships. This paper explored examples of firm coordination to support 
investments in training or retaining production technicians. Strategies to bolster and extend these 
activities should be considered in future workforce-planning efforts. 
  
                                                          
17 Training is included in the strategic planning and implementation of 15 Manufacturing USA locations nationwide 
(previously “National Manufacturing Innovation Network”) and increasingly integrated into firm-specific services 
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PAPER 3:  SUPPLYING SKILL: THE ROLE OF SMALL MULTI-NATIONAL FIRMS 
IN TRAINING PRACTICE TRANSFER 
 
Introduction 
When large Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) establish a branch plant location, 
they often need to create training systems to produce a skilled technical workforce. This 
investment in training is needed to ensure high quality, consistent products for export or to meet 
domestic demand. Further increasing workforce skill in their overseas locations, OEMs also 
transfer training and other practices to a select group of top supplier firms, sometimes inviting 
them to participate in joint training programs.  
But the role of OEMs in diffusing global training practices to firms at lower levels of the 
supply chain is less certain. Scholars often focus their attention on the OEM and their 
relationship with core suppliers, failing to recognize the underlying challenges or barriers to 
further training diffusion. Furthermore, this myopic focus on OEMs means scholars risk 
overlooking alternative channels for pushing global training standards throughout the entire 
supply chain. 
This paper reorients the focus from OEMs and their top suppliers to their next level of 
smaller, multi-national suppliers. Like OEMs, these smaller multi-nationals also have some 
internal capacity to invest in workforce training abroad. But their lower position in the global 
supply chain and exposure to local labor markets also means they can create a stronger bridge 
between the foreign and the local. Branch plants of foreign-owned suppliers are not only 
connected to the OEM, but often source from local manufacturers, meaning they are in a pivotal 
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position to influence skill development practices within their own supplier networks. Their role 
in supporting practice transfer is especially important given the proprietary nature of most OEM 
training programs. Furthermore, their smaller size means they may be more inclined than OEMs 
to engage public educational institutions. This suggests that smaller foreign-owned suppliers can 
embed the training standards of their home countries within public and private training programs 
abroad.  
To demonstrate the role of smaller multi-nationals in diffusing globally competitive 
training practices, this paper features the experiences of two German automotive suppliers that 
set up German-style apprenticeship programs in Mexico.  The findings shed light on practice 
transfer processes in general as well as on the nature of smaller multi-national enterprises and 
their potential contributions to local skill development systems. Still, the transfer of global 
training practices by smaller suppliers is not straightforward or conflict-free. As this study 
illustrates, relational and entrepreneurial work is needed on the part of these smaller multi-
nationals to establish new institutional models and structures.  
This research suggests that OEMs are not the only companies that can anchor skill 
development programs. In a local setting, smaller multi-national enterprises can have enough 
clout, capacity and interest to affect program development and change. They are well positioned 
to diffuse training practices to local firms as they are closer in size and located more proximally 
to local suppliers compared to their OEM counterparts. Broadly speaking, the findings of this 
research suggest opportunities for economic and workforce development practitioners to engage 
smaller multi-nationals when they establish a new plant and bring them in as strategic partners in 




The largest multi-national corporations (MNCs) control a substantial number of 
subsidiaries and vast supply chains, and their branch plant location decisions often dictate the 
allocation of resources across countries and local areas. Understandably, a firm’s size and supply 
chain position are central to the way we understand its power and industry influence.  Still, it 
may also be important to reckon with smaller-sized and even lower-tier firms’ capabilities and 
power, rather than simply equate smaller firm size and lower supply chain position with 
powerlessness and low ability, as we often do. 
Berger (2013) and her colleagues at MIT have explained that U.S. firm size is declining 
as firms outsource employment-generating activities in order to focus on their core 
competencies. Similar trends have been documented in Mexico: larger firms have been 
outsourcing employment-generating activities to smaller firms since the 1990s (Bensusán, 2012). 
This means that supply chains are longer and the distance between large MNCs and their lower 
tier or more peripheral suppliers—in terms of direct interactions and technological 
sophistication—is greater. Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck & Gereffi (2008) note that, as large firms 
disperse production activities, vertical supply-chain-based power is being re-consolidated in new 
ways. Specifically, they point to the rise of the “global supplier” in the automotive industry 
(Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, & Gereffi, 2008: 305-307; see also Rutherford & Holmes 2008: 
525; Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2005).18 While “global suppliers” tend to crowd out local firms from 
                                                          
18 Across industries, companies find it increasingly difficult to enter or move up in global supply chains, primarily 
because MNCs increasingly use established preferred suppliers or “follow source suppliers” (who follow from other 
sites) (Ivarsson & Alvstam, 2005). The structure of the automotive industry is particularly problematic in this way 
(McDermott & Corredoira, 2010; Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck & Gereffi, 2008; also Giuliani et al, 2005; Humphrey 




supply chain participation, they may also introduce new dynamics in support of local learning 
and upgrading (Pietrobelli & Staritz, 2013). 
The expansion of global supply chains suggests both shifts in multi-national firm power 
and effects on local learning processes. Allen (2003) explains that where global dynamics and 
relationships are embedded in local spatial configurations, an expansive view of firm power is 
necessary. As supply chains extend outward, the distribution of power also becomes more 
“fluid” and “territorialized” (Rutherford and Holmes, 2008, 2014). Horizontal rather than 
hierarchical relationships can take shape; that is to say, firms can gain power through their 
interactions with each other rather than amass power over others.19 Where horizontal 
relationships take shape at the lower end of the supply chain, increased associational and 
facilitative power can draw in greater support from institutions, including those that might 
otherwise serve only larger multi-nationals (Ramirez & Rainbird, 2010: 699).20 In other words, 
as power gathers further down the supply chain, smaller firms can work together to “mobilize 
resources across scales” (Rutherford & Holmes, 2008), including intensifying their engagement 
with public institutions and government-funded programs, leading to the development of new 
programs, policies or even institutional structures. 
Employee training is one of these program and policy areas where supply-chain based 
actors can play a role alongside local and global institutions in supporting supply chain 
development. Within firms, training practices may be coordinated between headquarters and 
                                                          
19 The understanding of how power is exercised in the Global Value Chain literature, and Global Production 
Network literature to a large extent, is that of a hierarchal power between firms in global value chains. One firm has 
power over another: an ability to determine terms of contracts and control behavior. 
20 Ramirez and Rainbird (2011) explain that technical training programs are viable pipelines for transferring codified 
knowledge to a broad array of actors including between clusters/nodes in and across global value chains, evoking 




branch plants (from headquarters in the home country to a branch plant in the host country); 
within supply chains training may be pushed by some actors along the supply chain—for 
example, by client to supplier (MacDuffie & Helper, 2007; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Dyer & Hatch, 
2006; Hatch & Dyer, 2004). Training can also be coordinated among smaller firms or with 
institutional actors outside the supply chain, as when the state or private training organizations 
are engaged to provide training services for a multi-national corporation (McDermott & 
Corredoira, 2010: 313-314).  
Large multi-national corporations are known to have many options for developing and 
deploying training resources. Their prominence enables them to attract the attention of state and 
local actors and influence them to create new public programs (Coe, Hess, Yeung & Dicken, 
2004). A multi-national corporation may simply wield its power over regional supply chains to 
leverage a state commitment to vocational training. When public institutions are in a stronger 
bargaining position, however, they may force multi-national corporations to negotiate for state 
support (Coe, Hess, Yeung & Dicken, 2004). However, large multi-national corporations often 
have internal training capacity, meaning they can avoid direct negotiation with public institutions 
and train in-house.  
In comparison, smaller firms are more resource constrained and more likely to be 
dependent on institutions for vocational training. For smaller multi-national firms that relocate 
overseas, this institutional dependency can come with its own unique set of challenges, 
particularly if the firm has a training practice that they want to transfer to their new host 
community. For this to be successful, the firm must contend with established employment and 
work preparation practices in the local community, and, especially when engaging public 
training institutions, likely must secure support and from local gatekeepers. In this respect, 
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training program implementation in overseas locations is not simply a case of wholesale transfer 
of a firm’s most effective training practices, but rather is necessarily a negotiation with socially 
embedded practices and engagement with established actors and norms for firm-to-firm and 
firm-to-institution coordination. 
This raises a number of questions. How do smaller multi-nationals transfer their best 
training practices to a branch plant location? What kind of partial or hybrid practices might 
smaller multi-national companies introduce to a local area? How do smaller multi-nationals 
engage local institutions in an institutional environment that often favors larger firms? Finally, as 
supply chains extend out and are reconsolidated and territorialized in new ways, will local firms 
be crowded out of learning and knowledge exchange, as scholars suggest, or are there ways to 
extend these opportunities down the supply chain? 
Empirical Setting, Data Collection and Analysis 
This paper focuses on two training program development efforts by smaller multi-
national companies. These cases were developed through interview-based research conducted in 
Puebla, Mexico, between 2014 and 2016. The author sought to understand how German branch 
plants had adapted home country training practices in a foreign environment. Both cases were 
selected because they involve a local automotive cluster where the OEMs and many of the first-
tier suppliers are of German origin.  
The City of Puebla, Mexico, is located 75 miles east of Mexico City and some 170 miles 
from the eastern port of Veracruz, in Mexico’s central automotive corridor. The local automotive 
cluster in and around Puebla is anchored by Volkswagen’s production plant, which produces cars 
for the Mexican, U.S., and E.U markets. The region has been upgrading its functional, process, 
and product capabilities since vehicle assembly began at Volkswagen of Mexico (VWM) in 
1964. VWM underwent major restructuring in the 1990s, and invested in an upgrade to the 
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Puebla facility in 2008. From the 1990s and through the early 21st century, VWM, like other 
foreign automakers, recruited home country and other “follow source” suppliers to co-locate 
with their assembly plant in order to provide large car parts and critical services in short time 
frames. By 2014, about 40 suppliers were located in close proximity to the VWM assembly 
plant, with at least 200 other direct suppliers located within a day’s drive. At the time this 
research was being conducted, further regional investments were underway in anticipation of 
Audi’s new plant opening in Puebla in 2016.    
This dense cluster of automotive parts suppliers makes Puebla a rich setting in which to 
observe multi-national companies of all sizes and a promising arena for the introduction of 
foreign training practices. As VWM expanded, so did its internal training systems. Established as 
a separate organization in 1996, but still operating on-site at the plant, the Volkswagen Institute 
provides employees with executive, management, and language courses and operates a technical 
training school.  
Attempts by VWM and the State of Puebla to coordinate public and private training 
resources had started but stalled in the late 1990s. This vision of public-private coordination 
would be achieved with Audi’s arrival, when a state-administrated training center opened outside 
the Audi plant in 2016. Between the late 1990s and 2016, other firms, including VWM suppliers, 
set their intentions on the adoption of German-style vocational training at their branch plant 
locations in the Puebla cluster and were engaged in processes of program expansion beyond the 
boundaries of their single firm. Focusing on these firms and their efforts allowed the author to 
observe the bumpy process of practice transfer across countries with different skill development 
norms and institutions. 
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The author conducted 53 semi-structured interviews and collected 60 brief, structured 
survey-style responses between August 2014 and July 2015 in the central Mexican states of 
Mexico, Puebla, Tlaxcala and Guanajuato. The majority of the interviews and observations took 
place in and around the City of Puebla, Mexico. Interviewees were identified through a snowball 
sampling method, beginning with prominent organizations, through which the author identified 
three cases of training practice transfer from Germany to Puebla. One additional training 
program was identified through a survey of news articles. In total, 12 interviews were conducted 
with staff at two OEMs and 11 were conducted with staff at six supplier firms. To better 
understand the regional training norms, the author conducted eight interviews with industry or 
employer associations; seven with public universities; six with private universities; three with 
state officials; and five with other training providers and experts. Eight company interviews 
included plant visits; four included training site visits. Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 
two hours.  
Interviews explored the activities of and connections between firms and educational 
institutions. In comparing the various models of training and public-private partnership 
encountered, the author primarily considered the length of training programs and the mix of 
classroom, lab, and on-the-job learning. Additionally, the author considered: the mix of general 
and specific training offered; the age and education of trainees; the structure of mentorship for 
trainees in the school and in the company; the qualifications trainees received; and the financing 
of training programs. In interviews with company representatives, the author sought to 
understand company training norms in terms of internal recruitment, screening, hiring, and 
training practices for production workers and production technicians, as well as how those 
practices have changed over time. The author also inquired about the use of external recruitment 
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or training partners, the practice of apprenticeship, and, where utilized, the process of 
apprenticeship practice adaptation and implementation, assessing the support that companies had 
in setting up their programs. 
Field notes and interviews were transcribed and each interview was tagged with the 
interviewee’s professional position, previous professional experience and employer information. 
Summaries for each interview were created and major themes identified; key words were created 
for major themes and used to re-evaluate all interview content during final analysis. Findings 
were organized and further developed around these themes. Sixty brief, structured interviews 
with workers from various firms also contributed to a broader understanding of the local training 
practices. These were summarized in one report and were found to be generally congruent with 
the main analysis and findings.  
The Dual Formation Model for Skilled Production Workers 
There are a variety of “best practices” in work organization, business operations, supplier 
management and client relations that are important for companies aiming to compete in global 
industries. This paper focuses on an area of improvement that is relevant to companies of all 
sizes in various industries in a variety of countries, yet is often taken for granted: the training of 
technical tradesmen and tradeswomen. Across manufacturing sectors, critical “production 
technicians” include machinists and machine maintenance technicians. These and other technical 
workers have the skills to efficiently operate and maintain machinery and tools. Scholars and 
policymakers pay attention to the training and preparation of these workers in part because 
addressing the economic demand for technical skills has the potential to dovetail with efforts to 
reduce high post-Recession unemployment rates experienced by young adults (Hoffman, 2011).  
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International interest in closer engagement between the education sector and employers 
has inspired emulation of the “dual formation” model exemplified by the German system.21 Pilz 
& Li (2014) and Euler (2013) describe the basic elements of a German-style dual formation or 
“apprenticeship” program, emphasizing operational elements—training locations, standards, 
teacher qualifications, student population, and trainee certifications—as well as governmental 
elements—multi-stakeholder joint decision making, funding, and oversight – and the program’s 
economic, social and individual development goals.22 The key to achieving the operational 
elements—teacher certifications, trainee certifications, funding and oversight—is that these are 
co-determined by public and private stakeholders. Given the difficulty of replicating the German 
system of governance, including labor representation, scholars simply emphasize the public and 
private sector coordination. Still, a much higher level of public-private coordination and a much 
greater engagement by employers and employer associations is required to sustain the dual 
formation process of education than most countries (other than Germany, Switzerland and 
Austria) have been able to achieve. In dual formation systems, the learning process at the work 
site is as important or more important than learning in the classroom. Employers must provide 
mentorship and structured on-the-job training, and they must also ensure that classroom lessons 
are advanced and classroom theories are applied at work. Likewise, vocational schools must do 
their part to ensure that classroom lessons are relevant to work applications; teachers must have 
                                                          
21 The “dual formation” model exemplifies global best practice in employee training, as evidenced by vocational 
education recommendations by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to its member 
countries; European efforts to advance dual formation training practices throughout the region; and a number of 
bilateral practice transfer agreements by Germany with other countries. 
22 Euler’s work (2013) is based on expert evaluation regarding the potential for practice transfer, drawing from the 
import and export history of the German apprenticeship model. The criteria from Pilz (2015) is evaluative, 
developed specifically to identify key aspects of the “Berufskonzept” (apprenticeship or occupational development) 
practice at individual establishments. 
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enough recent industry experience or exposure to make the connections clear and compelling. 
This is a challenge for many countries with vocational schools that operate independently from 
industry. 
Another critical distinction is that the German apprenticeship system engages young 
people in high school in their initial vocational training and early career preparation, easing 
young people’s transition from enrollment in secondary school to work. Engaging young people, 
their schools and teachers, their parents and communities, requires a high level of trust, buy-in 
and coordination between multiple actors, public and private. In some countries and 
communities, this level of engagement in vocational education requires a shift in norms and 
priorities, given the emphasis placed on college and more general educational requirements. 
Another way of judging whether a dual formation educational process has been achieved, in 
addition to the degree of employer participation, is the degree to which the public sees initial 
vocational education as a valid educational and career pathway (Euler, 2013). 
Scholars find that in spite of German government efforts since the 1960s to help 
companies implement the system abroad, there have been few cases of a large-scale or complete 
transfer. This suggests an opportunity to study attempted transfer cases, failures, and partial 
adaptations to understand how firms activated their agency and power in the diffusion process.  
Two Firms and Their Training Programs 
In the late 2000s and early 2010s, two smaller multinationals took steps to adopt elements 
of the German-style apprenticeship at their branch plant locations in Puebla, Mexico, in order to 
address the difficulties they encountered in recruiting and retaining skilled workers. Both 
companies, Wawa and Mecha, are suppliers to Volkswagen with a global headquarters in 
Germany and only a few other branch plants outside of Germany.  
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Table 17 describes the two companies. Compared to other multi-national firms, Wawa 
and Mecha are small, with only about 400 and 100 employees at their Puebla locations and 1,000 
and 6,000 employees worldwide, respectively. Their sizes and supply chain positions make these 
firms uniquely constrained in some ways and uniquely capable in others. This section of the 
paper describes each firm’s efforts to develop employee-training programs at their branch plant 
location, setting explicit intentions to transfer a German dual formation model.  
Table 17. Summary Information for Wawa and Mecha 
Company Wawa Mecha 
Headquarters 




1 Mexico (first international 
location), 1 USA, 1 Czech 
Republic 
2 Mexico. 2 U.S. 1 Brazil. 7 
Asia. 9 E.U. and other (14 
Germany) 
Year Established 
in Mexico 1993 2005 
Products  plastic parts machinery 
Global Sales $245 million $1233 million 
Global 
Employment 1,900 6,570 
Employment in 
Mexico 440 160 
Employment at 
Study Site 440 100 
Clients OEMs OEMs and Tier 1 
 
Incremental Program Development in the Periphery—Wawa 
In spite of Wawa’s previous experience with apprenticeship programs at its headquarters 
in Germany, the apprenticeship program at Wawa’s plant in Puebla developed incrementally 
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over several years. Volkswagen requested that Wawa establish a branch plant location in Mexico 
in the early 1990s, around the time that VWM was restructuring and outsourcing and when 
Mexico was loosening its local product sourcing requirements and more aggressively pursuing 
foreign direct investment. This was Wawa’s first plant established outside of Germany, officially 
a joint venture with a local Mexican company. Wawa established its plant about 70 miles from 
VWM, taking over a factory on an industrial site in a small town.  
Wawa’s first employees in Puebla were transitioning from agrarian work and had never 
worked in a factory. By the 2000s, the plant had upgraded its machinery and required more 
skilled labor for machinery maintenance as well as more skilled production technicians.  
Struggling to make do with intermittent visits from technicians headquartered in Germany, the 
company decided to train their own technicians. But by the 2000s, young people in the area were 
not attracted to manufacturing careers, nor were they interested in staying in the small town. 





In response to these challenges, Wawa set out to establish an attractive new employee 
recruitment program. Managers drew on expertise from headquarters and worked directly with a 
former consultant to Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz, a Master Apprentice trained in Germany 
who ran a training school23 and consulting business (herein “The Training School”) in nearby 
Mexico State.24 Unable to host a more substantial on-site training program, Wawa sent 
apprentices to The Training School for several weeks of intensive hands-on training every year. 
Wawa graduated its first class of apprentices in 2008; the first class of students trained in 
collaboration with the local high school graduated from the apprentice program in 2015.  
The German Chamber of Commerce (IHK), through the newly staffed IHK office in 
Mexico City, helped Wawa pursue schoolteacher and plant mentor training and certification, 
and, soon after, offered this suite of services to other companies. The consulting services of The 
Training School continue to provide individualized support and initial training capacity to firms 
in Puebla and across the country. These certifications and programs give Wawa increased 
credibility in its local efforts, ensuring a high standard of quality is maintained and helping 
attract trainees and gain the trust of local communities.25 
                                                          
23 The Training School is a private training firm that has developed curriculum and a school in Toluca, Mexico, to 
support dual education systems, or apprenticeship, based on the German model. The school was developed in 
Mexico for this precise purpose, the idea sparked from VWM’s activity to develop its own school in the 1990s. The 
Training School supports the IHK/AHK certification, functions as a testing as well as a training site, and provides 
ongoing support to firms in Puebla, Tlaxcala and nationwide. 
24 The German-Mexican Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Mexico (CAMEXA or AHK) is an official 
administrator of German training and certification. CAMEXA has a small staff dedicated to promoting and 
implementing the German dual education system in Mexico and has celebrated the development of local 
apprenticeship programs as an organizational priority. CAMEXA plays a key role in a pilot apprenticeship program 
with Mexico’s Secretary of Public Education. (The Training School plays a background role.) The organization is in 
charge of training the trainers that will support new programs across the country. 
25 The IHK credential, which apprentices gain when they pass a final exam, was not recognizable to most companies 
in Mexico, but it gave apprentices the very real benefit of a credential recognized by German companies worldwide. 
Not all companies in the local area have pursued the IHK test and credential, but its formalization helped position 
Wawa in the local labor market, validating the program’s value, and providing an excellent marketing tool.  
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By 2015, Wawa had achieved many of the programmatic elements of a dual formation 
program. The company had an established recruitment process, a designated mentor to train 
apprentices, both school-based and company-based learning sites, and established training 
curriculum and internal company rotation schedules for apprentices. On-site training facilities 
were minimal but sufficed. Wawa identified a dedicated space for the apprentices by simply 
pulling together a few desks in the plant’s administrative building. This small change made a big 
difference in the culture, allowing students to connect with each other for lessons after training 
separately across the production site.  
After Wawa and the local public school adjusted their own internal systems and resolved 
their coordination issues, they worked together to promote the intensive, high-commitment 
training model to other employers. They recruited several local businesses: in 2015, at least five 
other companies welcomed a new class of apprentices. By recruiting other companies, Wawa 
and the school had created a de facto cost sharing and demand-aggregating multi-firm training 
platform. When interviewed, local participants, Wawa representatives most of all, spoke to the 
economic, social, and individual development goals of the program.  
A perhaps unexpected barrier was local company capacity. Local, single-establishment 
companies that could not afford the consulting services of The Training School and had little 
experience that was applicable to training young people and related internal capacity 
development. While Wawa managers had been trained in the apprenticeship system in Germany, 
Mexican owners and managers had few reference points and struggled to adopt and sustain the 
high-commitment training model. One owner of a participating local company explained that he 
was personally dedicated to providing training and had benefited from his own initial training as 
an employee in a large chemical company, but it was difficult for his local single-establishment 
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company to dedicate sufficient in-house capacity to train and mentor the apprentices and to 
ensure the financial sustainability of the training investment. 
Where the Wawa program falls short of the German model is in its lack of joint 
determination of apprentice qualifications; qualifications are established separately by school 
standards, company training standards, and then the imported IHK standards. Given the missing 
element of joint determination, the Wawa case does not constitute a complete transfer of a 
German dual formation system. Despite this gap, the Wawa case does suggest that a German-
style apprenticeship can be implemented with adaptations, meeting company needs, engaging 
young people, and providing a structure for individual trainee development that becomes 
particularly important in a foreign context.  
Meanwhile, on the other side of the automotive cluster, another Volkswagen supplier 
and German multi-national was busy addressing a related but distinct set of challenges. 
Private Sector Response in the Core—Mecha 
As Wawa set up its program in the geographic periphery of the automotive cluster, 
Mecha was building a training program in the core. In an industrial park across the street from 
the Volkswagen plant, a number of Volkswagen’s large, multi-national parts and systems 
suppliers were struggling to meet increasing production demands: the plants had sufficient 




Illustration 2. Volkswagen and Mecha locations in the state of Puebla, Mexico 
 
The industrial park did not have a shortage of skilled workers per se, but industrial park 
residents were engaged in a vicious cycle of employee poaching. Competition was so aggressive 
that companies were posting recruitment messages on billboards across the street from their 
neighbors. In an effort to end this destructive cycle, area employers, all German automotive parts 
and service providers, agreed to start talking about ways to address their shared challenges. They 
all were familiar with the German apprenticeship system and were more or less familiar with 
each other. Not only did their parent companies share multiple global locations, but CEOs also 
attended the same international conferences.  
Mecha offered to set up a German-style training program in collaboration with the other 
automotive suppliers and eventually launched an independent training school. Like Wawa, 
Mecha believed that an apprenticeship program would address its shortage of skilled production 
technicians, serving as a recruitment tool, a skill development system, and generating mutually 
beneficial commitments from trainers and trainees. In the context of the industrial park, an 
apprenticeship program would also reduce direct labor market competition between companies, 
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establishing training and employment protocol for their investment in workers, a deterrent to 
continued system abuse.      
Mecha was in the unique position of already being a service provider to several of the 
concerned automotive companies in the park, at times even providing training services to other 
companies’ employees. Mecha imported, installed, and helped maintain critical equipment in 
these plants and already had senior staff with a high level of production expertise in-house. So, 
like Wawa, but with more explicit intentions from the start, Mecha offered a cost-sharing and 
demand-aggregating multi-firm training platform. Instead of partnering with a public school, 
however, Mecha launched its own private school, which was operating independently by 2014.  
In comparison to Wawa, the platform Mecha designed was more formal and uniform 
across firms. Mecha essentially provides a turnkey solution: any member company can plug into 
the program, provided they can support their own in-house on-the-job-training and mentoring 
and provide stipends and benefits for trainees. Mecha equips the training center, coordinates 
recruitment, and trains students in the classroom and the lab. Training specializations offered 
include tool mechanics (industrial mechanics technology in die-casting and stamping) and 
industrial mechanics (machine and systems technology). The programs each require three years 
of training, with 60 percent classroom and 40 percent on-the-job training. At the end of the 
training, students are tested and certified as technicians by the German Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry (IHK).26 They finish with the IHK certification and a two- to six-year contract with 
a participating sponsor company. 
                                                          
26 The German exam and certificate are from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Germany, coordinated in 
Mexico by the Mexican-German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as established by Germany’s professional 
education law of 1969. 
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Mecha initially launched with six companies committed to sponsor apprentices, and 
began promoting its dual training school, Entre, to training candidates. In the program’s first 
year, six companies—all Volkswagen suppliers and Mecha clients—took on two to seven 
apprentices each. Thirty total apprentices were enrolled. Seven additional companies joined 
between 2012 and 2015. Each company supports up to eight new apprentices each year. In 2014, 
90 apprentices had enrolled over three years, 19 to 36 entering each year. 
Internal capacity was not as prominent an issue among these multi-national companies as 
it was for the local firms that were participating in the public school program with Wawa. The 
German multi-nationals were familiar with the program offerings and large non-German multi-
nationals that joined later were able to conduct their own learning and capacity-building 
processes. The private school model was, however, not without its own challenges. Member 
companies paid membership fees to sustain the school, but some companies also convinced 
Mecha they had to permit them to take breaks (off years), allowing them to avoid paying for an 
ongoing service, and only plug in when convenient, reducing the reliability of the training 
program revenue. The public school model avoided this challenge as school-based training was 
publicly funded. 
By 2014, Mecha, like Wawa, had utilized the IHK standards and qualifications and 
achieved many of the programmatic elements of a dual formation program. Mecha’s school, 
Entre, was more loyal to the dual formation model and German-style apprenticeship, with better 
integration of on-the-job training with classroom education, given that the training school and 
employers were highly coordinated, almost inseparable—participating employers had launched 
the training school and the school was run by one of those employers. The high-level initial 
commitments by top area companies met the spirit of the high-commitment German-style 
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apprenticeship. But the school had no public funding or formal public partnership and fell short 
of the German model in this respect. In this respect, Wawa’s program, with public sector 
participation, more strongly demonstrated a commitment to not only economic but also social 
and individual development goals for apprentices, another element of the dual formation model. 
Mecha participants did not attest as directly to social or individual development goal. See Table 
18 for a summary of these differences. 
Table 18. Characteristics of Dual Formation Programs Launched by Wawa and Mecha 
Anchor Firm Wawa Mecha 
School Site Local high school Private training school, hosted on site in industrial park 
Key Participating Firms Wawa, otherwise participation varies 




Firm internal training, high 
school capacity building, student 
success 
Firm internal training, client 
service, reducing industrial park 
competition for skilled labor 
Commitment to  
Economic and  
Social Goals 
Multi stakeholder commitments 
sustain program; local area 
upgrading and student success are 
explicit goals 
Student and business satisfaction 
are important to business model 
Teacher Training and 
Certification;  
Apprentice Learning 
Standards and Testing 




Responsible for apprentice and 
related expenses 
Membership fees locked in for 
years; responsible for apprentice 
and related expenses 
Potential for Networked 
Sites to Extend Practice 
School systems; coordinated 
school sites 











Revisiting the cases in 2018, the author finds that Wawa and Mecha continue to sustain 
their local programs and, presumably, their advantages within them. Since helping to establish 
these programs, technical assistance providers at the German Chamber of Commerce (IHK) and 
The Training School consulting company have taken on central roles in a national initiative to 
further adapt and extend the dual formation model across Mexico. Wawa and Mecha became 
accidental activists at the national level, as they sought to defend their programs and solicit their 
expansion as the national task force and then the national initiative was developed.  
While both models had the potential for expansion across multiple sites, clearly one was 
better situated for roll out through the public school system. Mecha’s private model was not 
picked up by a national partner, in spite of its more replicable turnkey model for training as 
service provision. 
Conceptualizing the Case Comparison 
International business scholars have suggested it is rare for firms to make an intentional 
effort to transfer training practices in a manner that is faithful to home country practice (Kostova, 
1999). Vocational training scholars report it is rare to see a successful practice transfer (Euler, 
2013; Pilz, 2015). But the two firms studied in this paper demonstrate that a degree of dual 
formation practice transfer is indeed possible.   
While the “partial” practice transfers fall short of a complete transfer of the German 
apprenticeship system, these examples offer insight about firm behavior, power, and potential. 
Reflecting on the roles of Wawa and Mecha in this study, the smaller multi-national firms acted 
first as entrepreneurs and then as anchors to dual formation programs. As entrepreneurs, they 
adapt global best practices; as anchors, they provide a hub for further development. Each anchor 
firm is deeply involved in program development and expansion. 
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The anchor firms’ supply chain positions support their efforts at establishing German-
style apprenticeship programs. Both firms are branch plants of multi-national suppliers in the 
global automotive industry. Their clients produce cars for the advanced and highly competitive 
U.S. and European markets. And their clients require technological and social sophistication in 
product and service delivery. They both have access to global best practices and management 
resources, but they lack the capacity to develop robust training systems in-house in the branch 
plant location, making them more dependent on local institutions and external partners than 
larger multi-national companies. The firms’ shared country of origin means that they launched 
their programs with a similar reference point and notions of best practices in training: both 
Wawa and Mecha believed that a German-style apprenticeship program would address a local 
shortage of skilled production technicians and establish beneficial protocols for participating 
firms. 
Both firms also rely on substantial institutional and organizational supports to set up their 
programs. They activate these supports through relational work across local and international 
networks. Each draws resources from the home country as well as from the host country. To 
maintain their programs, both firms rely on continued support from The Training School and 
IHK, which draw updated technical requirements and testing materials from those established by 
German government, labor unions, and business chambers. IHK programs include a Train the 
Trainer curriculum and apprentice testing programs. While standards developed in Germany 
might not be a perfect fit for Mexico, these standards are nonetheless a valuable resource, 




While technical assistance providers help the firms transfer elements of the German 
system, other adaptations are necessarily the purview of participating firms. Practice transfer, 
therefore, relies both on the codified elements of the German system and the local re-
development of a German-style apprenticeship system, requiring substantial entrepreneurial 
work by well situated multi-national firms. The differences between the Wawa and Mecha 
programs suggest that a variety of practice transfer scenarios potentially stem from their 
competitive positions in global supply chains. Even with similar origins, networks, and 
resources, the anchor firms’ motivation and program design varied by location as well as product 
and market orientation. Each anchor firm’s geographic location in the industry cluster (periphery 
vs. core) and labor market position in its micro geography (rural area vs. industrial park) 
influenced its German-style apprenticeship program design. In the periphery location, the firm’s 
high skill demand, larger comparative size, and ability to pay higher wages than other companies 
helped the anchor firm draw benefits from program development and expansion. In the core 
location, skill demand and the potential to expand existing client services were motivating 
factors. Each company built on its initial orientation in extending the programs. Wawa dabbled 
in more social entrepreneurship while Mecha’s approach was more commercially oriented.  
Left out of this paper’s analysis of German-style apprenticeship programs in the Puebla 
automotive cluster is an older, OEM-initiated dual formation program established at the Puebla 
VWM plant, which was formalized in 1996 as the Escuela de Becarios at the Volkswagen 
Institute. Compared to the style of most dual formation programs in Germany, the VWM 
program is a misfit, as it failed to establish 1) an independent training school with public sector 
support, and 2) access to regular on-the-job training during the initial training period. 
Volkswagen originally aimed for its training program to be supported by the state but 
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negotiations for such support were unsuccessful. VWM’s first external partnership in training 
program development was in 2009, when they established an engineering degree at a private 
university. But in 2014, their vocational training service had still only been extended to top 
strategic suppliers.  Now it seems that efforts by Wawa and Mecha, along with increased 
scrutiny from the IHK and the Mexican government, might nudge Volkswagen to modernize its 
program at the Escuela de Becarios to meet the IHK’s training and testing standards. 
With this broader context, we can see that VWM’s “failure” to fully transfer a German-
style dual formation system to Puebla allowed some of its smaller suppliers to elevate and 
advance certain elements of a dual formation system and introduce some innovations while 
increasing their own local reputation and visibility. 
Conclusion 
We often write about small multi-national enterprises as if they are purely subordinate to 
their larger client OEMs, but power is relative, and the agency of smaller-sized firms lower on 
supply chains should not be ignored. Critical examination of smaller multi-national enterprises, 
including follow-source suppliers, reveals that they are influential in some locations and practice 
areas. The two examples provided in this study suggest that smaller multi-national firms can be 
influential in their local labor markets and micro-geographies (e.g., industrial park in the cluster 
core or rural town in the cluster periphery). Within these local contexts, their comparatively large 
size and access to global resources can anchor local training efforts. As they act in their own best 
interest, drawing inspiration and resources from abroad, they create a bridge between the global 
and the local—connected to global corporate networks, but still reliant upon local alliances. 
Their ability to accrue benefits from their investment improves their staying power, enhancing 
their ability to anchor a program in the long term. 
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The broader international recognition of German-style apprenticeship as a best practice 
since the Great Recession, and the expansion of relevant institutional supports outside of 
Germany, make it increasingly possible for German firms to accomplish this type of practice 
transfer to branch plant locations. Non-German firms experience more difficulty adopting and 
transferring German-style apprenticeship, but may still be successful. A generalization of the 
case study findings in this paper to clusters across North America’s automotive manufacturing 
periphery (the U.S. South and Mexico) is also possible. Both “global suppliers” (co-locating with 
OEMs worldwide) and “follow source suppliers” (asked to co-locate in specific locations) are 
increasingly prominent in various supply chains. An injection of foreign “follow-sourcing” 
suppliers (suppliers required to co-locate with clients) affected all clusters beginning in the 
1990s, leveling the playing field regarding what is possible in each of these regions, particularly 
regarding the behavior and skill demands of follow-source suppliers.  
Had VWM succeeded in the 1990s in forging an agreement with the State of Puebla to 
create a German-style apprenticeship system, the local history might have been very different. Its 
failure to completely adopt and extend this now globally recognized best practice model to the 
local area created an opening for entrepreneurship by smaller firms and their technical assistance 
providers, who in turn established their prominence in local and eventually even national skill 
upgrading systems. This sequence of events demonstrates that once a practice is introduced, a 
local anchor organization can act as an agent or policy entrepreneur in the host area to advance 
or reconstitute the practice and further facilitate practice transfer between co-located firms.  
The process of practice transfer is not only incremental, with each program building on 
the previous efforts of others and iterating across program development stages, but is also 
evolving with the expansion of global supply chains. The emerging potential for the diffusion of 
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training practices from headquarters to branch plant (or home to host country) is, in part, a 
function of increasing foreign direct investment and increased institutional supports for transfer 
in branch plant locations. The largest MNCs play a role, preceding their follow source suppliers 
in the branch plant location, and sometimes creating a surplus of technical assistance in the 
region that indirectly influences suppliers’ behavior. While transferring global best practices in 
labor management from an OEM’s headquarters to its branch plants and supply networks has not 
previously been successful (Barrientos, 2007; Locke, 2013), this case of training practice transfer 
shows that smaller multi-nationals and their branch plants can serve as hubs for the introduction 
of new practices. Headquarters and powerful clients may motivate and incentivize practice 
transfer, but branch plants and suppliers themselves need to initiate and sustain critical local 
partnerships and international networks. 
This ability to bridge the global and the local is important given the increasingly 
asymmetrical relationships between larger multinationals and local suppliers. Smaller multi-
nationals are well positioned to addressing this gap by imitating their clients and collaborators: 
activating the support of organizations both global and local, expanding their programs and 
introducing their practices to other companies and interested organizations in the region. By 
adapting a system first introduced by their larger client through the co-production of public and 
private training programs, Wawa and Mecha extended their locational advantages as well as their 
visibility, allowing them to accrue benefits by sustaining the training programs.  
Policymakers and scholars should be careful not to discount the potential for smaller 
multi-national enterprises to break down barriers to, and introduce new mechanisms for, practice 
transfer. While there is no assurance that smaller multi-national corporations will be more 
collaborative and locally embedded than their larger more powerful clients, it is possible that 
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they will enact power and influence in different ways. In at least two cases, their anchoring and 
extension activities helped to extend training services further than expected, engage other 
locally-based firms, and create new infrastructure and networks for vocational training in the 






Allen, J. (2003). Lost Geographies of Power. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Barrientos, S. (2007). Global production systems and decent work. Geneva: ILO Policy 
Integration Department. 
Carrillo, J., & Bensusán, G. (2012). “Corporaciones Multinacionales y Practicas de Empleo En 
Mexico.” In La Situación Del Trabajo En México, 2012. El Trabajo En La Crisis, pp. 
731–769. 
Berger, S. (2013). Making in America: From innovation to market. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Coe, N. M., Hess, M., Yeung, H. W. C., Dicken, P., & Henderson, J. (2004). 
‘Globalizing’regional development: a global production networks 
perspective. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 29(4): 468-484. 
Dyer, J. H., & Hatch, N. W. (2006). Relation‐specific capabilities and barriers to knowledge 
transfers: creating advantage through network relationships. Strategic Management 
Journal, 27(8): 701-719. 
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The relational view: Cooperative strategy and sources of 
interorganizational competitive advantage. Academy of Management Review, 23(4): 660-
679. 
Euler, D. (2013). Germany's dual vocational training system: a model for other countries? 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. 
Hatch, N. W., & Dyer, J. H. (2004). Human capital and learning as a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. Strategic Management Journal, 25(12): 1155-1178. 
Hoffman, N. (2011). Schooling in the Workplace: How Six of the World's Best Vocational 
Education Systems Prepare Young People for Jobs and Life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Education Press. 
Ivarsson, I., & Alvstam, C. G. (2005). Technology transfer from TNCs to local suppliers in 
developing countries: A study of AB Volvo’s truck and bus plants in Brazil, China, India, 
and Mexico. World Development, 33(8): 1325-1344. 
Kostova, T. (1999). Transnational transfer of strategic organizational practices: A contextual 
perspective. Academy of Management Review, 24(2): 308-324. 
Locke, R. M. (2013). The promise and limits of private power: Promoting labor standards in a 
global economy. Cambridge University Press. 
 
107 
MacDuffie, J. P., & Helper, S. (2007). Collaboration in supply chains: With and without trust. In 
C. Heckscher & P. Adler (Eds.), The Firm as a Collaborative Community (pp. 417-466). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
McDermott, G. A., & Corredoira, R. A. (2010). Network composition, collaborative ties, and 
upgrading in emerging-market firms: Lessons from the Argentine autoparts 
sector. Journal of International Business Studies, 41(2): 308-329. 
Pietrobelli, C., & Staritz, C. (2013). Challenges for global value chain interventions in Latin 
America. Inter-American Development Bank. 
Pilz, M., & Li, J. (2014). Tracing Teutonic footprints in VET around the world? The skills 
development strategies of German companies in the USA, China and India. European 
Journal of Training and Development, 38(8): 745-763. 
Ramirez, P., & Rainbird, H. (2010). Making the connections: bringing skill formation into global 
value chain analysis. Work, employment and society, 24(4): 699-710. 
Rutherford, T. D., & Holmes, J. (2008). ‘The Flea on the Tail of the Dog’: Power in Global 
Production Networks and the Restructuring of Canadian Automotive Clusters.” Journal 
of Economic Geography, 8(4): 519–544.  
Rutherford, T. D., & Holmes, J. (2014). Manufacturing resiliency: Economic restructuring and 
automotive manufacturing in the Great Lakes region. Cambridge Journal of Regions, 
Economy and Society, 7(3): 359-378. 
Sturgeon, T., Van Biesebroeck, J., & Gereffi, G. (2008). Value chains, networks and clusters: 












The outsourcing of employment-generating activities from larger to smaller companies 
puts the relationship between skill and wages at risk. This dissertation suggests ways to restore 
that relationship, drawing attention to firm-to-firm dynamics in global value chains and local 
clusters.  
This dissertation explored whether smaller firms require skilled labor and how they 
acquire it. I examined these questions in the context of the U.S. automotive industry and in two 
sub-national automotive clusters in South Carolina and Puebla, Mexico. Integrating approaches 
from cluster and supply chain-based research, my findings demonstrate how power and resource 
asymmetries between firms can affect local skill development systems and firms’ prospects for 
upgrading in global supply chains.   
The first dissertation paper addressed how skill is dispersed across industries supplying 
the U.S. automotive industry. This exploration was necessary because there is conflicting 
information about the skill requirements of large and small firms. In the automotive industry, 
brand-name Automakers control most of the value-added activities in their supply chains: they 
spend the most money on research and development and they receive the most patents. But their 
plants are also the most automated, raising questions about the kinds of skills they require of 
production workers. Smaller, lower tier automotive suppliers—such as machine shops and metal 
product producers—are known to require highly skilled trades people, but they tend to train 
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through informal, internal systems in ways that make skills hard to measure and reward, and they 
pay lower wages.  
To investigate these trends, I grouped industries into two supply tiers. The industries 
most utilized by Automakers were included in Tier 1; those most utilized by Tier 1 were 
included in Tier 2. Overlaying these tiers with their occupational skill requirements, I found that 
the lowest tier requires the greatest percentage of workers with more than a high school degree 
and more than one year of related work experience. I also found that the relationship between 
skills and wages is unclear: wages vary by tier, but in the opposite direction as skill 
requirements. The results for Tier 1 are particularly interesting as these intermediate goods 
suppliers seem to control much of the skill in the supply chain, through direct employment and 
sub-contracting, while their skill measures and wage rates vary by state.  
The second paper in this dissertation further investigated issues of skill demand and 
compensation, focusing on the training decisions of lower tier automotive suppliers in South 
Carolina’s Upstate automotive cluster. I replicated the method from the first paper to show skill 
and wage requirements by supply tier for South Carolina and found similar results. Drawing 
insights from interviews with company representatives and county economic development staff, I 
found that supply chain dynamics negatively affect smaller companies’ abilities to train and 
compensate skilled workers. Cluster dynamics can both exacerbate and assuage these negative 
supply chain pressures.  
To identify how improved training practices can be extended to smaller companies, the 
third dissertation paper investigated how smaller multi-national enterprises have developed 
apprenticeship programs in their branch plant locations. Although better training practices among 
smaller companies are often derived from larger multi-national corporations, I demonstrated that 
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smaller multi-nationals have agency in their own right and are well positioned to introduce new 
training models in a foreign environment. They are more flexible than their larger counterparts, 
but also have more resources than smaller, local firms. With the appropriate institutional 
supports, smaller, multi-national enterprises can adapt the training programs of their larger 
clients and extend the reach of both public and private training programs to benefit firms at the 
lower end of the supply chain. 
Policy Implications 
The relationship between occupational skills, wages and supply chain position is critical 
to understanding why some firms succeed at investing in local skill development systems while 
others fail. Economic and workforce development policymakers and practitioners receive vast 
amounts of information on each of these issues—skill demand, employee compensation, and 
supply chain dynamics—but rarely have an opportunity to weave these issues together to inform 
strategies for local development. These connections are important if we are to advance effective 
human-centered economic development strategies. Each of the individual papers in this 
dissertation has identified strategies that can help guide local development. 
The first paper showed that smaller firms in lower tier supply sectors of the U.S. 
automotive industry require a higher percentage of skilled tradesmen than Automakers, but do 
not translate higher skill demand into higher wages. The automotive industry clearly depends on 
these skills, yet these lower wages risk impeding skill regeneration and upgrading. Economic and 
workforce development practitioners can use this analysis to begin or reinvigorate skill-centric 
conversations with employers in high- and low-skill sectors. Industry leaders can use it to 
demonstrate the extent to which larger firms rely on the skills of their supply network and to 
motivate investments in skill development across the supply chain.  
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In the second paper, I reported how larger firms rely on the skill investments made by 
their suppliers. Because some suppliers have the technical knowledge to generate their own 
trainee pipelines in house, I recommended dedicating funding to provide local manufacturing 
firms with the resources to rebuild vocational training programs. To sustain their investments in 
these programs, suppliers must ensure these programs help them create a competitive advantage 
to grow and advance their businesses. To further address the risk of poaching by larger 
companies, I also suggested that economic development practitioners link public support to 
supplier development programs in advance of client expansion events, in order to help suppliers 
retain their core workers. The success of this strategy depends on suppliers having clear 
opportunities to grow and expand their businesses.   
In the third paper, I reported that smaller multi-national companies can be key to helping 
draw down critical resources for building local skill development systems. I recommended 
expanding technical assistance provision so that these firms can build such programs across 
various global locations. I also proposed that economic and workforce development practitioners 
engage multi-national companies when they establish a new plant, bringing them in as partners 
in the development of local skill development systems. These multi-national companies have the 
resources and, because of their industry prominence and ability to pay higher wages than local 
companies, will reap the benefits of this engagement. Given the large investment that is required 
when moving to a new location, it is critical that these companies are successful in their first few 
years.  
 Limitations of the Research 
The first paper presented an analysis of publicly available data at the national level.  
While the method is replicable across various supply chains, the automotive example is 
particular to the automotive industry and cannot be otherwise generalized.  A major construct 
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validity issue was discussed in detail, regarding the measurement of “skill.” Two measures were 
used—education and experience—to capture different elements of the construct. 
The limitations to using publicly available data to evaluate skill requirements by industry 
and supply chain tier include: 1) delays in the publication of the benchmark (detailed) national 
input-output tables by the Bureau of Economic Analysis; 2) Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Occupational Employment Statistics occupational “staffing patterns” are only available for four-
digit NAICS codes and require the assumption that staffing patterns do not vary across 
establishments within industries; and 3) O*NET data on skill requirements by occupation do not 
vary by industry, requiring the assumption that skill requirements for occupations do not vary 
across industries. The third limitation is the most egregious because it is difficult to address and 
makes it challenging to assess very important differences between large and small firms in the 
same supply chain across different industries (e.g., between Automakers and machine shops). 
The greatest limitation to the case studies presented in papers two and three is external 
validity, which is limited by the focus on manufacturing sectors related to the automotive 
industry and the focus on growing automotive clusters anchored by a large German Automaker.  
Some recommendations regarding inter-firm dynamics will likely be applicable across industries 
and clusters, while others will not. In the latter category are those recommendations that rely on a 
foreign branch plant or a concentration of branch plants to introduce a new training practice. 
Otherwise, the potential for the diffusion of training practices from supplier to supplier, 
including from foreign to local, is a function of supply and demand environments (institutional 
supports in the home and host area) and the ability of an anchor organization to act as an agent or 
policy entrepreneur in the host area. Supply chain position, local labor market position, local and 
global networks and ability to mobilize resources will inform the orientation of the anchor 
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organization.  Non-German firms would have more difficulty adopting and transferring German-
style apprenticeship, but it is not precluded.  
A unique local history can also reduce external validity, but a generalization of the case 
study findings to clusters across North America’s automotive manufacturing periphery (the U.S. 
South and Mexico) would not be misguided. The unique factor in the Puebla case was 
Volkswagen of Mexico’s adoption of German training practice at its own plant in the 1990s. 
Still, an injection of foreign follow sourcing suppliers affected all clusters from the 1990s, 
leveling the playing field regarding what was possible in each of these regions, particularly 
regarding the behavior and skill demands of follow source suppliers.  
Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation offers a structured approach to a complex issue. It provides planners 
with additional information regarding the interaction between global and local actors in 
economic development by demonstrating how the relationships between firms can contribute to 
and undermine local skill development ecosystems. Additional research can bring clarity to some 
of the outstanding issues that have been raised.   
In the longer term, the tools I introduce and the findings I reported can help local areas 
better prepare for the inevitable disruptions from trade and technological change. This 
dissertation highlights the fact that much of our knowledge regarding skill demand is based on 
trends in skill supply (e.g., higher returns to higher education) as well as the hiring and 
compensation trends exhibited by larger firms (also higher returns to education). We often 
overlook evaluation and planning efforts to update the skills of the workforce in smaller firms, 
assuming that investments made by and in larger firms will “trickle down.” There are a number 
of barriers to this process, both institutional and resource-based; in reality, neither public 
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programs nor skills tend to “trickle down” from larger to smaller firms. Instead, skills and skill 
development investments may require substantial draw-down efforts. 
In order to make progress on longer term planning issues, additional data collection and 
evaluation is needed. This dissertation shows that a firm’s orientation toward skill investment is 
related to its supply chain position. Supply chain and cluster-based case studies have enriched 
our understanding of how this key variable affects individual firm decisions and intra-regional 
dynamics. Unfortunately, this is difficult to measure at the firm or establishment level. 
Information about supply chain position is missing not only from publicly available data, but 
also from other survey-based research. (For example, helpful questions are missing in the 
Georgia Manufacturing Survey; automotive industry surveys by Sue Helper are an exception, as 
they have included a few questions about clients and suppliers).  
In order to make near term progress investigating intra-industry variation in “staffing 
patterns” (occupational mix), existing establishment-level survey data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics could be matched to information on each establishment’s supply chain position. This 
would help us understand, for example, whether automotive-serving establishments are different 
from non-automotive-serving establishments in the same industry. Conducting this research at 
the state level is feasible and has the potential to inform nationwide survey construction, 
improving the chances that questions about supply chain position are attached to establishment-
level data in future data collection efforts.  
Advancing our understanding of how occupational skill requirements differ across 
industries and establishments requires either direct observation, access to expert analysis, or the 
use of job posting descriptions. This information would help us understand whether the skill 
requirements of a machinist at an Automaker are different from the skill requirements of a 
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machinist in a lower tier supply sector. If there were major differences, O*NET and other skill 
databases would need to be updated.  
Given the similarity in the data used across North America, efforts for more 
comprehensive data collection could be coordinated. This would allow for more comparative 
research. For example, future research on skill development at the sub-national and industry 
level in the U.S. and Mexico could focus less on process and more on outcomes so that progress 
across clusters can be quantified and compared. This work does not necessarily require updating 
national databases; surveys, interview projects and case studies could be advanced on a more 
reasonable timeline. 
There is also additional work needed to ensure multiple measures of skill are used in 
national and international assessments of the “skill content” of products and trade in value added 
goods, where researchers are interested in assessing changes in skill requirements and comparing 
skill requirements across countries. This is particularly important in studying manufacturing 
industries and production workers. Research should continue to demonstrate the limitations of 
standard proxies for skill, like formal education or wage level, as well as to develop alternative 
and more encompassing measures. 
 
